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朝鲜的核武,日本的困境

更新时间:2017-9-15 12:47:11 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, Japan’s Bind
朝鲜的核武,日本的困境

Pyongyang’s recent missile launch over Hokkaido and its underground nuclear test have laid bare Japan’s Achilles’ heel: Our country’s national security policy is still woefully ill equipped for this mounting danger. The new sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on Monday will hardly limit Japan’s exposure.

平壤最近发射的飞越北海道上空的导弹,及其进行的地下核试验让日本的致命弱点暴露无遗:我国的国家安全政策在这个不断增长的威胁面前仍严重不完善。联合国安理会周一通过的新制裁也几乎无法减少日本所面临的威胁。

North Korea’s latest provocations pose an unprecedented threat. Even during the Korean War in the early 1950s, Japan, as a rear support base for United States forces, was somewhat insulated; today, it is in the same theater as South Korea, also on the front lines. Any American military strike against North Korea would likely trigger retaliatory measures against Japan.

朝鲜的最新挑衅带来的威胁是前所未有的。即使是在1950年代初的朝鲜战争期间,作为美国军队的后援基地,日本曾受到了一定程度的保护。如今,日本与韩国同处在一个战场上,而且都在前线。美国对朝鲜的任何军事打击都可能引发对日本的报复性措施。

Japan is in a terrible predicament: Highly exposed but with very few options, military or diplomatic, to help itself.

日本的处境十分尴尬:暴露在高度危险之下,但却几乎没有能用来帮助自己的军事或外交选择。

Its defense ministry plans to double, to eight, the number of ships equipped with the Aegis missile-defense system. But the new fleet won’t be operational before 2021. Even if Japan also acquires the land-based Aegis Ashore system, as it is contemplating doing, none of this additional capacity could offer it enough protection against North Korea’s increasingly lethal missiles — much less deter North Korea from further developing its own arsenal.

日本防卫省计划把装有宙斯盾导弹防御系统的舰船增加到八艘,也就是翻番。但是,新舰队在2021年之前不会投入使用。即使日本按照正在考虑之中的计划,还购买陆基的宙斯盾岸上系统,任何这种附加能力也不能为日本提供足够的保护,来抵御朝鲜越来越致命的导弹,更不用说阻止朝鲜进一步发展自己的武器库了。

This is one reason Itsunori Onodera, the new defense minister, has been making a case for developing Japan’s offensive capabilities, so that it could strike military bases in North Korea, perhaps even preemptively. But such a move faces numerous obstacles — financial, tactical and strategic.

这就是新上任的防卫大臣小野寺五典(Itsunori Onodera)一直在为发展日本进攻能力阐明的理由之一。这样的能力可以让日本能够打击朝鲜的军事基地,也许甚至是先发制人的打击。但是,攻击能力的发展面临着财政、战术和战略方面的诸多障碍。

No budget decision for such capabilities is expected to even be made until at least late 2018. Acquiring offensive weaponry would require redefining the terms of Japan’s existing security agreement with the United States, which relegates Japan to a purely defensive role and places all responsibility for any offensive action solely with America.

就连发展这种能力的预算决定预计也至少要等到2018年底。获得进攻性武器将需要重新定义日美安全保障条约的现有条款,现有条款把日本摆在只能起纯粹防御性作用的地位,把采取任何进攻性行动的责任完全放在美国身上。

In the face of these constraints, some pundits and officials in Washington are arguing that Japan, as well as South Korea, might, and perhaps should, consider acquiring nuclear weapons themselves.

面对这些限制,华盛顿的一些专家和官员正在争辩说,日本以及韩国可以考虑、或也许应该考虑获得自己的核武器。

The idea is a nonstarter. According to an opinion poll conducted in June and July, only 9 percent of Japanese respondents think Japan should acquire nuclear weapons. (About 67 percent of South Koreans polled said that South Korea should get such weapons.) The nuclearization of Japan — or South Korea — would undermine nonproliferation efforts, as well as validate North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship to date.

这个建议并不现实。据今年6、7月进行的一次民意调查,日本受访者中只有9%的人认为日本应该获得核武器。(约有67%的韩国受访者说韩国应该获得这种武器。)让日本、或韩国装备核武器会损害防扩散工作,而且还证实了朝鲜迄今采取的核冒险政策的有效性。

Given the difficulties of developing an independent military capability, Tokyo has no choice but to pursue a diplomatic solution with the help of other states — even though several multilateral efforts have failed in the past and bilateral relations between some of the main players today arguably are more fraught than ever.

考虑到发展自身独立军事能力的困难,东京别无选择,只能在其他国家的帮助下寻求外交解决方案,尽管过去的几次多边努力都失败了,而且一些主要参与国之间的双边关系如今可以说比以往困难得多。

Relations between Tokyo and Seoul have long been uneasy, largely because of unresolved issues from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 1930s and 1940s, including about so-called comfort women, Korean women who were coerced or compelled into having sex with Japanese soldiers. And the new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, appears to be taking a firmer stand on that question than his predecessor, who signed an agreement with Japan in 2015 hoping to finally settle the matter. It is now very difficult to imagine, for example, that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could ever operate on South Korean soil, even to assist with, say, an evacuation after an attack by North Korea.

东京与首尔之间的关系长期以来一直不稳定,这主要是因为日本在1930年代和1940年代占领朝鲜半岛期间遗留下来的问题没有得到解决,包括强迫或迫使韩国女子与日本士兵发生性关系的所谓慰安妇问题。新近上任的韩国总统文在寅似乎在这个问题上采取了比他的前任更坚定的立场,他的前任曾在2015年与日本签署一项协议,希望能最终解决这个问题。但现在很难想象日本自卫队在韩国领土上行动的任何可能性,就连发生朝鲜打击后帮助人员撤离的行动也不可想像。

At the same time, however, as the threat from Pyongyang becomes more ominous, the pressing need for an effective response may suggest, even create, new diplomatic opportunities.

但与此同时,随着平壤的威胁变得越来越严重,对有效回应的迫切需要也许意味着、甚至创造了新的外交机会。

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and President Trump seem to have quickly developed an intimate working relationship, and that — along with South Korea’s moves to strengthen its security ties with the United States — may allow for more effective cooperation among the three countries, despite difficulties between Japan and South Korea. This trilateralism, in turn, could form the basis for five-party talks including China and Russia, and eventually lead to the resumption of negotiations with Pyongyang as well.

日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)和美国总统特朗普看来已经很快建立了一种亲密的工作关系,这种关系、以及韩国加强本国与美国的安全关系的做法,也许可以让这三个国家进行更有效的合作,尽管日本与韩国之间存在着问题。反过来,这种三边关系可以为举行包括中国和俄罗斯在内的五方会谈形成基础,并最终走向与平壤恢复谈判。

The U.N. Security Council’s decision to cap North Korea’s oil imports, though a watered-down version of the penalties sought by the United States government, was significant nonetheless. For one thing, it was a reminder that coordinated action with China and Russia, which have been wary of imposing more sanctions against Pyongyang, is possible.

联合国安理会限制朝鲜石油进口的决议尽管比美国政府寻求的惩罚力度要低,但仍然重要。它至少提醒我们,与中国和俄罗斯一起采取协调行动是可能的,中俄两国一直不太愿意对平壤施加更多的制裁。

On this front, too, North Korea’s recent brinkmanship may have unexpectedly paved the way for new (if slim) possibilities for cooperation. Mr. Abe and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia seem to have developed an effective line of communication, including on intractable-seeming issues, like the status of contested islands in the Pacific. And the chances for at least some measure of rapprochement between Japan and China may be growing. Building bridges with Beijing remains a loaded notion for many Japanese people, but Mr. Abe now has more clout and political capital to try, in the name of protecting Japan against the more immediate threat posed by North Korea.

从这方面来看,朝鲜最近的冒险政策可能意外地为新的(尽管微弱)合作可能性铺平了道路。安倍晋三和俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·V·普京(Vladimir V. Putin)似乎已经建立了一个有效的沟通渠道,包括在比如太平洋中有争议岛屿的法律地位等看似棘手的问题上。日本与中国之间达成至少一些和解的机会可能也在增长。虽然与北京建立良好关系对许多日本人来说仍是一个复杂的问题,但是,在保护日本不受朝鲜更直接威胁的名义下,安倍晋三现在有更多的影响力和政治资本来尝试改善关系。

The recent escalation of the North Korea crisis seems to have validated Mr. Abe’s controversial efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense posture. The Japanese public is now more open to adopting a tougher stance. The new leader of the opposition Democratic Party, Seiji Maehara, is a hawk, and under his leadership the party, traditionally an advocate of pacifism, is likely to support, if perhaps reluctantly, the Abe administration’s hard-nosed approach to security.

最近朝鲜危机的升级,似乎证实了安倍晋三为加强日本防务姿态所做的备受争议的努力。日本公众现在较多地接受采取更强硬立场的做法。反对党民主党的新领导人前原诚司(Seiji Maehara)是个鹰派人物,在他的领导下,长期倡导和平主义的民主党很可能会支持(尽管也许不情愿)安倍晋三政府在安全问题上采取的强硬态度。

There is no viable military solution to the North Korea crisis. Japan, like the other main parties, must make the most of the slivers of opportunity created by the escalating threat to renew efforts at finding a multilateral diplomatic solution.

朝鲜危机没有可行的军事解决办法。日本与其他主要国家一样,必须充分利用不断升级的威胁所创造的一线机会,重新为寻求多边外交解决办法而努力。

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