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现实很无情:朝鲜已是核武国家

更新时间:2017-7-11 10:01:58 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

North Korea and Its Weapons Programs Are Now a Fact of Life
现实很无情:朝鲜已是核武国家

North Korea’s once-unthinkable nuclear and missile capabilities are, as long as the country wants, here to stay.

只要朝鲜愿意,它那一度不可想象的核能力和导弹能力便会存在下去。

With each North Korean nuclear or missile test, U.S. officials go through a ritual that appears increasingly at odds with reality.

朝鲜人每开展一次核试验或导弹试验,美国官员就要走一遍看上去愈发与现实相悖的过场。

They declare that they will not tolerate the rogue programs they have demonstrated little ability to slow, much less remove. They organize more of the talks or sanctions that have failed to alter North Korea’s strategic calculus. And they issue threats that, if carried out, would either change little or risk an all-out war.

他们宣称不会容忍流氓项目——但却甚少展示遏制那些项目,更别提将其摧毁的能力。他们组织开展更多对话或实施更多制裁——但相关对话或制裁却改变不了朝鲜的战略意图。他们语出威胁——但如果将威胁付诸行动,要么起不了什么作用,要么有引发全面战争的风险。

But the best that Washington can hope for, analysts and former officials increasingly say, may be to freeze the program in place. Even this would most likely come at a steep cost, a grim recognition both that the threat is severe and that U.S. leverage is limited.

不过分析人士和前官员越来越多地表示,华盛顿所能期望的最好情形,或许是冻结现有项目。即便是这样也极有可能需要付出巨大代价,需要沮丧地承认威胁之严峻、美国手中筹码之有限。

“The window for denuclearization closed a long time ago,” Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, wrote in a column this week.

“无核化的窗口很久以前就关闭了,”蒙特雷国际研究院(Monterey Institute of International Studies)东亚核不扩散项目(East Asia Nonproliferation Program)主任杰弗里·刘易斯(Jeffrey Lewis)本周在一篇专栏中写道。

The threat can be managed, he continued, only by “accepting the unacceptable” as a hard fact of life.

他还表示,只有“把无法接受的事情”当成无情的现实来“接受”,才能管控威胁。

North Korea has achieved this through more than just missiles and bombs. By exploiting the dynamics of nuclear warfare and diplomacy, this otherwise weak country, whose economy is estimated to be smaller than that of Birmingham, Alabama, can dictate terms to the world’s most powerful country.

朝鲜做到这一点所借助的不仅仅是导弹和炸弹。通过善加利用核战争和核外交态势,这个本来颇为孱弱、经济规模据估计比阿拉巴马州伯明翰还小的国家,竟然可以和世界上最强大的国家谈条件。

North Korea’s Asymmetrical Advantage

朝鲜的不对称优势

The United States now faces the hostile end of a nuclear deterrence model it was the first to develop.

当初率先制定实施核威慑战略的美国,如今面对的是这一战略不利于自己的一面。

In the early years of the Cold War, with American-allied West Germany facing down an overwhelming Soviet threat, the United States promised any attack would prompt nuclear retaliation.

冷战初期,美国在其盟友西德极力抵御来自苏联的巨大威胁之际誓言称,会以核报复回应任何攻击。

It worked, deterring the Soviets even from an invasion of West Berlin that it could have completed in a matter of hours.

这种办法起了作用,苏联人受到震慑,甚至没敢入侵西柏林,而它本来只用几个小时就可以完成这一行动。

North Korea may have achieved a similarly effective deterrent. Though it would quickly lose any war, it could impose unacceptable costs on South Korea, Japan and potentially the United States.

朝鲜或许已经获得了同样有效的震慑力。尽管会快速输掉任何战争,但它可以让韩国、日本,或许还有美国,付出无法承受的代价。

North Korea has developed certain technologies that, taken together, demonstrate something analysts call “asymmetric retaliation,” with which it can guarantee a nuclear response to any attack.

如果把朝鲜已经研制出来的某些技术放在一起,便能看出分析人士口中的那种进行“不对称报复”的能力,朝鲜凭此可以确保对任何攻击做出核回应。

Its medium-range missiles can hold South Korea and Japan, where tens of thousands of U.S. troops are based, at risk. Special canisters allow the missiles to remain pre-fueled, shortening launch time. Track-driven mobile launchers can hide in remote locations, forcing U.S. war planners to doubt that strikes could eliminate all such missiles before they are launched.

其中程导弹可将驻扎着数万美军的韩国和日本置于危险境地。特殊的筒罐让这些导弹可以预装燃料,从而缩短发射时间。轨道式可移动发射器可以隐蔽在偏远之处,让美国战争规划者不得不怀疑,相关袭击能否在这类导弹发射前将其全部摧毁。

A missile submarine, while believed to be the only such vehicle in North Korea’s modest navy, increases the country’s odds of landing at least one retaliatory strike.

一艘导弹潜艇让朝鲜至少发起一次报复性袭击的可能性有所增大——尽管这据信是朝鲜不起眼的海军仅有的此类工具。

As a result, any conflict, even limited, would require the United States to be willing to sacrifice thousands of American lives and far more South Korean lives. Both countries are prosperous democracies — normally strengths that, up against the more risk-willing North Korea, become weaknesses.

结果,制造任何冲突,哪怕是有限的冲突,都要以美国愿意牺牲数以千计的美国人以及远多于此的韩国人的性命为前提。美韩都是繁荣的民主国家,面对更乐于冒险的朝鲜,通常意义上的优势变成了劣势。

The Terrible Logic of First Strikes

关于先发制人的可怖逻辑

There is another force working in North Korea’s favor, known as “first-strike instability,” in which both sides must fear that any exchange, however small, will escalate to nuclear launches.

还有一种因素对朝鲜有利,即所谓的“由先发制人引发的不稳定”——对峙双方肯定都担心,任何交火,不论规模多小,都会升级为核打击。

In the Cold War, this kept the United States and the Soviet Union locked in a comparable balance of power. On the Korean Peninsula, it does something otherwise impossible: It puts North Korea on equal footing with the United States.

冷战期间,这让实力相当的美国和苏联处于均势。但在朝鲜半岛,这催生了某种原本不可能出现的局面:朝鲜得以和美国平起平坐。

North Korea’s strategy makes clear that even a limited strike, either to eliminate its weapons or its leadership, would prompt a full retaliation.

透过朝鲜的战略可以清楚地看到,哪怕是旨在摧毁其核武器或领导层的有限袭击,也会迅速招致全力报复。

Because North Korea sees the weapons as its only hope for survival, losing them risks provoking the country’s fears of a full invasion or an effort to topple the government. And because Pyongyang believes it can survive such a threat only by retaliating, its incentive is to do so before it is too late.

朝鲜把这些武器视为生存下去的唯一希望,因此如果失去它们,朝鲜便会置身于对本国遭到全面入侵或本国政府被推翻的恐惧之中。另外,平壤坚信进行报复是自己不被这种威胁吞噬的唯一办法,因此它有充分理由赶在为时已晚之前采取行动。

The United States’ overwhelming strength is, paradoxically, also a weakness. North Korean leaders must consider even a limited strike or accidental escalation as the start of a war they could lose within hours, virtually forcing them to immediately execute their full war plan.

矛盾的是,美国的压倒性优势同时也是劣势。即便是有限的打击或事态的意外升级,也肯定会被朝鲜领导人视为一场他们可能用不了几个小时就会输掉的战争的开端,从而促使他们立即执行自己的全面战争计划。

This constrains U.S. options. Even a single strike — for example, to destroy a missile or merely to punish the government — risks provoking a full war.

这就限制了美国的选项。哪怕是仅仅一次旨在捣毁一枚导弹或惩罚朝鲜政府的袭击,也有可能挑起一场全面战争。

This has held for decades. In 1969, when North Korea shot down a U.S. Navy plane, killing 31, the Nixon administration chose not to respond, fearing that North Korea would misperceive any attack as the start of a war. This logic has held as the stakes have grown.

几十年来一向如此。1969年,当朝鲜击落美国海军的一架飞机,导致31人丧生的时候,尼克松政府选择不做回应,因为担心朝鲜会错误地把任何袭击视为开战。随着利害关系日益增大,这种逻辑一直发挥着作用。

Still, U.S. policy toward North Korea could always shift, particularly under President Donald Trump, who considers unpredictability an asset. While it is difficult to foresee a U.S. option that overcomes these risks, that does not prevent Washington from trying.

不过,美国的对朝政策可以不断变化,尤其是在把不可预测性视为资产的唐纳德·特朗普总统治下。虽然难以想见美国将拥有能规避前述风险的选项,但这并不妨碍华盛顿进行尝试。

An Underlying Political Problem

一个根本性的政治问题

In other such standoffs, military risks can be reduced by addressing the underlying political causes. Iran, for instance, was persuaded to surrender components of its nuclear program in exchange for integration into the global economy, which it saw as a more desirable way to secure its future.

在其他此类僵局中,可以通过解决政治上的根本问题来降低军事风险。例如,伊朗经劝说同意放弃部分核计划,以换取融入全球经济的机会,它认为后者可以为自己的未来提供更好的保障。

North Korea’s political problems may be beyond amelioration.

而朝鲜的政治问题或许难以得到改善。

“It is the regime’s awareness of a pending legitimacy crisis, not a fear of attack from without, which makes it behave ever more provocatively on the world stage,” B.R. Myers, a North Korea scholar at Dongseo University in South Korea, wrote in a 2010 book on North Korean ideology.

“它之所以在国际舞台上以愈发挑衅的姿态行事,是因为意识到即将迎来合法性危机,而非害怕来自外部的攻击,”韩国东西大学(Dongseo University)的朝鲜问题学者、曾在2010年以朝鲜的意识形态为题写过一本书的B·R·迈尔斯(B.R. Myers)说。

The country’s greatest threat is not American power but South Korean prosperity. Pyongyang’s official ideology of race-based nationalism requires describing the Korean people as one nation, temporarily divided.

这个国家面临的最大威胁不是美国的权力而是韩国的繁荣。以基于种族的民族主义为要旨的朝鲜官方意识形态,需要把朝鲜半岛上的人描绘为一个暂时分裂的民族。

But South Korea’s stronger economy and freer society leave the Pyongyang government with little reason to exist. Ending hostilities would risk a German-style reunification that would subsume the North under South Korean rule.

但韩国的经济更强大、社会更自由,让平壤政府几乎没有什么存在的理由。结束敌对状态要冒着引发德国式统一的风险——那会把朝鲜置于韩国的统治之下。

Only a perpetual state of near-war can stave off reunification while justifying the North Korean state. And only nuclear-armed missiles can make that standoff survivable.

只有永久的战争在即状态既可以避免统一,又可以为朝鲜政权的存在提供理由。而且只有搭载核弹头的导弹可以让这种僵局持续下去。

No amount of U.S. power or will could impose a threat that North Korea will see as costlier than destruction nor offer an incentive more valuable than survival.

在朝鲜看来,不论美国拿出多少力量或意愿,都不会构成比毁灭更大的威胁,也无法提供比生存更强的动力。

A Symbolic North Korean Victory

朝鲜的一场象征性胜利

William J. Perry, a former secretary of defense, said in January, “It is my strongly held view that we don’t have it in our power today to negotiate an end to the nuclear weapons program in North Korea.”

前国防部长威廉·J·佩里(William J. Perry)于今年1月表示,“我强烈认为,我们现在没有能力通过谈判终结朝鲜的核武器项目。”

Rather, he said, the United States should aim to “lessen the danger” by seeking an end to missile tests.

他说美国应该把目标定为:通过设法终结导弹试验来“减少危险”。

Mark Fitzpatrick, a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, this week advocated something known as “double suspension.” The United States would suspend its military exercises with the South while the North would suspend its nuclear and perhaps missile tests.

本周,国际战略研究所(International Institute for Strategic Studies)的学者马克·菲茨帕特里克(Mark Fitzpatrick)倡导实施所谓的“双暂停”方案——即美国暂停与韩国的联合军事演习,朝鲜则暂停其核试验,或许还有导弹试验。

There has been a broader shift toward such thinking. The ambition is no longer to roll back North Korea’s programs, but to mitigate the risk they pose day to day.

已经有更多人转而这样考虑问题。其追寻的目标不再是遏制朝鲜的核项目,而是降低它们日复一日带来的风险。

This is a tacit acknowledgment that North Korea’s preferred negotiations model — in which the United States takes steps away from the Korean Peninsula in exchange for peace — is increasingly accepted.

这其实是默认,朝鲜所青睐的谈判模式正日益被接受——在这种模式中,美国会采取措施远离朝鲜半岛,以换取和平。

Even if North Korea never achieves its vision of full victory, it has shifted the conversation to its terms.

即便朝鲜从未取得其眼中的全面胜利,也已经让对话向自己开出的条件倾斜。

Fitzpatrick and others say that the United States should pursue such steps only if they point toward North Korean disarmament, but some consider this optimistic.

菲茨帕特里克等人认为,唯有朝鲜同意裁军,美国才应该采取这些举措,但一些人并没有这么乐观。

Ankit Panda, a senior editor at The Diplomat, and Vipin Narang, a professor at MIT, wrote this week that there were “no good options” for the United States, “only bad ones and catastrophic ones.”

《外交官》(The Diplomat)杂志高级编辑安吉特·潘达(Ankit Panda)和麻省理工学院(MIT)教授维平·纳兰(Vipin Narang)于本周撰文称,对美国来说“没有好选项”,“只有坏选项和灾难性选项”。

Any viable deal with the North Koreans, they suggested, “would require explicit acceptance of their nuclear state status and significant rollbacks to the U.S. conventional military presence in the Northeast Asian theater, both of which are nonstarters for the United States.”

他们表示,有望与朝鲜人达成的任何协议,“都会要求明确认可他们的核国家地位,并极大削减美国在东北亚地区的常规军事存在,两者对美国来说都不可行。”

The likeliest outcome, they concluded, is that the world’s nations “learn to live with an ICBM-armed North Korea.”

他们得出结论,最可能出现的结果是,世界各国“学着适应一个拥有洲际弹道导弹的朝鲜”。

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