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美苏峰会,一段特朗普需要了解的历史

更新时间:2017-7-7 10:12:27 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

A Cold War Summit Offers Lessons for Trump Before Putin Meeting
美苏峰会,一段特朗普需要了解的历史

A new president inexperienced in the intricacies of superpower politics meets his Russian rival for the first time. There are disputes over Crimea, nuclear weapons and completely different conceptions of an acceptable status quo as Washington and Moscow vie for global influence. The Americans arrive with an unclear agenda; the Russians have a very clear one.

在错综复杂的超级大国政治之中,没有经验的新总统第一次会见了他的俄罗斯对手。华盛顿和莫斯科在争夺全球影响力的过程中,就克里米亚与核武器等问题存在争议,对于何谓可接受的现状也有着完全不同的观念。美国人在会面时没有明朗的议程;俄罗斯人的议程却很清晰。

While it sounds like the coming encounter between President Trump and the current Russian leader, Vladimir V. Putin — an encounter scheduled for Friday — this actually was a description of President John F. Kennedy’s first face-to-face session with Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev of the Soviet Union in June 1961.

这听起来像是特朗普总统和现任俄罗斯领导人弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir V. Putin)即将于周五到来的一次会面,但其实是在描述1961年6月,约翰·F·肯尼迪(John F. Kennedy)总统与苏联总理尼基塔·S·赫鲁晓夫(Nikita S. Khrushchev)的第一次面对面会谈。

“You know, Mr. Kennedy, we voted for you,” Khrushchev said, as he recalled in his 1970 memoir. It is a line that, if one believes American intelligence reports, Mr. Putin could repeat, but probably will not.

“你知道,肯尼迪先生,我们的票是投给了你的,”赫鲁晓夫在1970年的回忆录中称自己当时这样说道。如果有人相信美国情报机构的报告,那么普京也大可以重复这句话,但他很可能不会那么做。

But it is the other lessons of that meeting in Vienna — which stretched over two days, three meals, a clumsy effort by Khrushchev to charm Jackie Kennedy and a tough one to threaten her husband — that might be useful to the Trump White House. It was one of the most remarkable leader-to-leader encounters of the Cold War, a story of caution about the dangers of walking into such a session without clear strategic goals.

那次会议在维也纳举行,为期两天,共同进餐三次,赫鲁晓夫笨拙地对杰姬·肯尼迪(Jackie Kennedy)施展魅力一次,摆出强硬姿态吓唬她的丈夫一次——但那场会议得出的其他经验教训可能对特朗普的白宫有用。那是冷战时期最引人注目的领导人会面之一,它警示人们,如果没有明确的战略目标就参与这样的会议,将会有多么危险。

Minutes after the meeting was over, Kennedy told James Reston of The New York Times that it had been an incredibly rough session, for which he had been ill-prepared.

会议结束几分钟后,肯尼迪对《纽约时报》的詹姆斯·雷斯顿(James Reston)说,这是一场非常艰苦的会议,他并没有做好准备。

“Worst thing in my life,” Kennedy said, according to later histories of the event. “He savaged me.” (Mr. Reston, perhaps protecting the background nature of the conversation even long after Kennedy’s death, did not quote the conversation directly in his memoir, “Deadline.”)

“这是我人生中最糟糕的一件事,”据史料记载,肯尼迪当时说。“他把我给活吞了。”(可能是考虑到这场对话的背景,雷斯顿直到肯尼迪去世很久之后,也没有在他的回忆录《截止日期》[Deadline]中直接引用这段对话。)

Mr. Reston expressed surprise that the young president came out of the meeting — then, as now, in a time of deteriorating relations with Moscow — determined to show his toughness, someplace. “And the place to do it, he remarked to my astonishment, was Vietnam!” Mr. Reston recalled.

让雷斯顿感到惊讶的是,这位年轻的总统离开这次会议之后——当时和现在一样,美俄关系正处在恶化阶段——便决心在某个地方展现自己的强硬。“我惊讶地听到他对我说,这个地方就是越南!”雷斯顿回忆。

How much of this history is known to Mr. Trump and his aides is a mystery. Both Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, the president’s national security adviser, and Steve Bannon, one of Mr. Trump’s closest political advisers, are deeply steeped in both ancient and American history — and General McMaster wrote a book about the flawed decision-making in Washington over the war Vietnam.

特朗普和他的助手们对这段历史了解多少,目前不得而知。总统的国家安全顾问H·R·麦克马斯特(H.R. McMaster)中将和特朗普最亲密的政治顾问之一史蒂夫·班农(Steve Bannon)都曾深入研究古代史和美国史——麦克马斯特将军还写过一本书,讨论越战期间华盛顿的错误决策。

Still, General McMaster sent a bit of a shiver through Washington last week when he said that the meeting with Mr. Putin on Friday had “no specific agenda.” He added: “It’s whatever the president wants to talk about.”

不过,麦克马斯特上周在华盛顿的讲话让人有点担心,他说周五同普京的会议“没有具体的议程”。他补充说:“总统想说什么就说什么。”

Historians who have focused on the Kennedy-Khrushchev interaction say the lesson of the encounter is that having no agenda is a bad idea.

研究肯尼迪与赫鲁晓夫之间互动的历史学家说,那次会面的教训是:没有议程是一个坏主意。

Michael Beschloss, the presidential historian who has written extensively on the meeting, said that one lesson from the Vienna encounter “is that when two leaders of important world powers have their first meeting as heads of state, the results can be very dangerous unless the agenda has been carefully planned by both sides, and unless each leader has a number of experienced officials in the room who are a significant part of the discussions.”

研究美国总统的历史学家迈克尔·贝施洛斯(Michael Beschloss)写过大量关于那次会议的文章,他说维也纳会议的一个教训是,“当两个重要世界大国的领导人第一次以国家元首身份会面时,结果可能非常危险,除非议程已被双方精心筹备,除非两个领导人都把一些经验丰富的官员带进会议室,并让他们成为讨论的重要组成部分。”

There are differences, to be sure.

当然,这两次会面之间也是有区别的。

Kennedy entered the meeting as a hawk, after warning of a nonexistent “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Trump enters after more than a year in which he has never had an unkind word to say about Mr. Putin, or his authoritarian rule — and has disputed the accounts of American intelligence officials who say the evidence is beyond doubt that Mr. Putin himself ordered the meddling in the American elections.

肯尼迪在会面之初采取的是一种鹰派姿态,此前他刚警告,美俄两国之间存在一种“导弹差距”——这是无中生有。而特朗普在会面之前这一年多的时间以来,从来没有对普京或他的威权统治说过一句坏话,并且还对美国情报官员的说法提出异议,后者称有确凿证据表明,普京亲自下令对美国选举进行干预。

Kennedy did start with a theme that it is easy to imagine Mr. Trump adopting: That the United States and its adversary had to understand each other’s views. But one of the many heated debates between Kennedy and Khrushchev was over the question of meddling in the affairs of other countries.

肯尼迪先从一个主题切入,很容易想象这个主题同样被特朗普采纳,那就是美国及其对手必须了解彼此的观点。但是肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫之间就干涉其他国家这个话题展开了激辩。

According to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the historian who was given notes of the meeting for his book “A Thousand Days,” the two leaders argued about which one spent more time manipulating elections and other leaders.

历史学家小亚瑟·M·施莱辛格(Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.)在他的《一千个日子》(A Thousand Days)一书中写过这次谈话,他描述两位领导人就双方究竟谁花了更多时间来操纵其他国家的选举和领导人这个话题争论不休。

“How could we work anything out when the United States regarded revolution anywhere as the result of Communist machinations?” Khrushchev was paraphrased as telling the president. “It was really the United States which caused revolution by backing reactionary governments,” he said in comments that Kennedy took as part warning, part lecture.

“如果美国把世界各地的革命都视为共产主义阴谋的结果,我们怎么能讨论出任何事情呢?“施莱辛格这样复述赫鲁晓夫对总统说的话,“革命其实是由美国对反动政府的支持引起的。”施莱辛格在评论中说,肯尼迪觉得这话半是警告,半是训斥。

In response, Kennedy noted Khrushchev’s pledge to back wars of national liberation — something the Soviet Union, like Russia today, attempted through tools including the kinds of “information operations” conducted more recently in the United States and Europe. That was the beginning of a lengthy, often ideological debate. The gruff Kremlin leader believed the United States was out to humiliate the Soviet Union and to contain Communist power. Each viewed the other as the aggressor.

作为回应,肯尼迪指出,赫鲁晓夫承诺要恢复民族解放战争——就像如今的俄罗斯一样,当时的苏联也试图通过前不久在美国和欧洲进行的“信息行动”等手段发起这类战争。之后,双方就开始了冗长而又往往带有意识形态色彩的辩论。粗鲁的克里姆林宫领导人认为,美国力图羞辱苏联,遏制共产主义势力。双方都将对方视为侵略者。

“I want peace,” Mr. Schlesinger quoted Khrushchev as saying, “but if you want war, that is your problem.”

“我想要和平,”施莱辛格引用赫鲁晓夫的话说,“但如果你想要战争,那是你的问题。”

Kennedy responded, “It is you, and not I, who wants to force change.” The two men then got into a spat about the Western protection of Berlin, and the benefits of capitalism versus Communism.

肯尼迪回答说:“想要用武力带来改变的人是你,而不是我。”之后两人就西方对柏林的保护,以及资本主义与共产主义的优劣口角起来。

Mr. Trump’s past comments suggest that he is unlikely to engage in similar discussion. Neither he nor Mr. Putin wants to waste much time on ideological debate. Mr. Trump has expressed doubt that Russia is trying to settle old scores in the region, or restore its past influence.

特朗普先生过去的言论表明,他不太可能做类似的讨论。他和普京都不想浪费太多时间进行意识形态辩论。特朗普曾表示,他怀疑俄罗斯是否真的试图在该地区了结宿怨,或谋求恢复过去的影响力。

And in an interview that Mr. Trump gave to The New York Times last year, the then-presidential candidate said he was not especially inclined to continue sanctions over Russian activity to destabilize Ukraine, or its seizure of Crimea. In fact, the White House has been looking to weaken sanctions against Moscow.

而去年特朗普在以总统候选人身份接受《纽约时报》采访时表示,他并不特别倾向于继续因俄罗斯颠覆乌克兰或占领克里米亚的行动对其进行制裁。事实上,白宫一直在试图削弱对莫斯科的制裁。

One of the big questions is whether Mr. Trump will press for the return of Crimea to Ukraine and an end to Russian activity to destabilize the Ukrainian government — regular talking points for the past several years. And Mr. Trump and his secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, seem unlikely to press Russia on its military support of the Syrian government.

最大的问题之一是,特朗普是否会敦促克里米亚回归乌克兰,并敦促俄罗斯结束对乌克兰政府的颠覆活动——这些都是过去几年里美俄对话的固定内容。特朗普和他的国务卿雷克斯·W·蒂勒森(Rex W. Tillerson)似乎不太可能会就俄方对叙利亚政府的军事支持方面施压。

What that 1961 summit meeting was really about, of course, was each man taking the other’s measure — and this one will be, too. Khrushchev was uncertain whether Kennedy “intended to be more belligerent toward the Soviet Union than Eisenhower had been, or not,” Mr. Beschloss said. “Kennedy studied for it but went in with excessive faith in his ability to think on his feet.”

当然,1961年的首脑会议上最重要的一点是,两人都在估量对方的实力——这一次也会是这样。赫鲁晓夫不确定肯尼迪“对待苏联是否会比艾森豪威尔更加好斗,”贝施洛斯说,“肯尼迪研究了这一点,但他出席会议时,对自己随机应变的能力过于自信了。”

Mr. Trump clearly shares that self confidence. And no one should expect Mr. Trump to declare that he was savaged, or to admit that the meeting went badly, even if it turns out that way. After all, Mr. Trump always talks about his abilities to make a deal.

特朗普显然有着同样的自信。没有人会指望特朗普宣布自己“被活吞”,或者承认会面非常糟糕,即使结果真的是这样。毕竟,特朗普先生总说自己擅长做交易。

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