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谁来承担特朗普贸易保护主义的代价

更新时间:2017-7-6 10:12:20 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

Trump’s Trade Choice: Follow the Postwar Order or Blow It Up
谁来承担特朗普贸易保护主义的代价

It seems President Donald Trump is ready to start rolling back globalization. Let’s hope he doesn’t blow up the postwar economic order.

看样子唐纳德·特朗普总统已经做好了开始抵制全球化的准备。让我们祈祷他不会让战后经济秩序毁于一旦。

While Mexican negotiators waited for the United States to make its first move in its proposed renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the president last week turned on the invective against another trade deal he called unfair — that negotiated by the Obama administration with South Korea.

美国拟就北美自由贸易协定(North American Free Trade Agreement,简称NAFTA)重新进行谈判,当墨西哥谈判代表等待其迈出第一步的时候,特朗普总统上周又把矛头对准了另一项据他说不公平的贸易协议——那是由奥巴马政府和韩国达成的。

Largely in place with the confirmation of Robert Lighthizer as the nation’s top trade diplomat in May, the president’s trade team seems itching to deploy a wall of trade protection around the U.S.

罗伯特·莱特希泽(Robert Lighthizer)出任美国贸易代表一事在5月确定下来以后,总统的贸易团队基本就位。该团队似乎非常想在美国周围竖起贸易保护之墙。

This would include new tariffs on imports of steel — and maybe also aluminum — based on the novel argument that the imports somehow endanger national security. The administration is also mulling anti-dumping duties on Canadian aircraft and countervailing duties on imported solar panels.

这将包括依据一项新奇的主张——进口对国家安全构成了某种威胁——增设钢铁进口关税,也许还有铝。此外本届政府正在考虑对加拿大航空器征收反倾销税,对进口太阳能板征收反补贴税。

A lot of this may look tame when set alongside Trump’s fiery campaign speeches portraying trade as the bane of the American worker. He no longer calls for a 45 percent tariff on imports from China, nor does he threaten to walk away from NAFTA.

然而这些和特朗普总统在竞选演说中的激烈言辞比起来显得缓和了许多,在演讲中他把贸易说成是美国工人不幸的根源。如今他不再主张对进口自中国的商品征收45%的关税,也不再扬言退出NAFTA。

Despite his campaign promises to voters in industrial states eager for protectionism, some analysts suggested that Trump might ultimately be hemmed in by the standard pro-trade orthodoxy of the Republican Party.

尽管特朗普在竞选期间对迫切希望看到保护主义抬头的工业州选民作出过种种承诺,但一些分析人士认为,他最终可能会受到共和党一贯的贸易促进传统思维的制约。

But the relative moderation of the administration’s recent trade initiatives is hardly reassuring. It’s not just that many of his proposals will invite retaliation from the nation’s trading partners — inviting the prospect of a protracted tit-for-tat trade war. The most frightening aspect of Trump’s approach is the seeming contempt for the rules and institutions that have underpinned global trade since World War II.

不过,特朗普政府近期相对温和的贸易主张很难令人放心。这不仅是因为他的很多方案将招来美国的贸易伙伴的报复——有可能引发旷日持久、针锋相对的贸易战。特朗普的方针最可怕的一面在于,它看上去是对二战以来为全球贸易提供支撑的规则和制度的蔑视。

Might Trump hew to the rules overseen by the World Trade Organization even as he retreats from prior U.S. commitments to global trade? Or will he eschew the multilateral framework in pursuit of a set of bilateral deals, turning his back on a long history of trade diplomacy?

特朗普会在不兑现美国早前的国际贸易承诺的情况下,遵守由世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization,简称WTO)监督实施的规则吗?还是说他会绕开多边框架,寻求签订一系列双边协议,背弃历史悠久的贸易外交?

These days, quite a few economists show sympathy for the argument that some trade protection may be warranted to help workers in industries threatened by imports.

近来,不少经济学家对这样一种观点表示了赞同:为了帮助受进口商品威胁的一些产业的工人,或许有必要实施某种程度的贸易保护。

Protectionism will not add to U.S. jobs or raise wages, on the whole. At best it will shuffle jobs around — adding some in protected companies like steel makers and cutting some in industries that buy steel, like auto manufacturers. By making the economy less efficient, protectionism will also make the nation poorer as a whole.

总体而言,保护主义不会增加美国的工作岗位或推高工资。它充其量只能促使工作机会重新排列组合:钢铁生产商等受保护企业的工作岗位有所增加;购买钢铁的那些产业的企业,比如汽车生厂商,工作岗位则会减少。在降低了经济的效率后,国家作为一个整体会变得更穷。

But maximizing economic output is not the nation’s only objective. The case for trade liberalization also relies on the proposition that winners in the process will compensate the losers whose jobs are displaced. If U.S. politics impedes any redistribution of trade’s spoils, perhaps there is a case for restoring equity by throwing sand in the cogs of trade.

但经济产出最大化并不是这个国家的唯一目标。贸易自由化的依据还在于这样一个主张:贸易自由化过程中的赢家会给丢掉工作的输家以补偿。如果美国政治要阻止一切对贸易收获的再分配,那么或许会想到往贸易的齿轮中扔沙子,以便恢复公平。

“It would be decreasing the size of the pie to increase the size of some slices,” as David Autor, a top labor economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, put it to me once. “We have always done the opposite thing without making people whole.”

“这会让整个蛋糕变小,以便让其中的某些份额变大,”麻省理工大学(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)权威劳动经济学家戴维·奥特(David Autor)曾对我说。“一直以来我们做的都是相反的事,没有考虑人的得失。”

What’s more, unanticipated shocks over the last quarter-century — when information technology swept through every industry and China emerged from nowhere to become the world’s biggest exporter — might justify reconsidering market-access commitments made earlier. “Maybe at the end of the day some trade responses are reasonable,” said Robert W. Staiger, a trade economist from Dartmouth College.

更重要的是,过去25年间,信息技术席卷每一个行业,中国横空出世,成为世界最大出口国,一系列出人意料的冲击或许让美国有理由重新思考其早前做出的市场准入承诺。“或许到头来一些贸易回应是合理的,”达特茅斯大学(Dartmouth College)贸易经济学家罗伯特·W·史泰格(Robert W. Staiger)说。

And yet even accepting that the U.S. may find it reasonable to retreat from trade somewhat, it is critical to figure out what this retreat might look like.

不过,即便承认美国也许有理由在贸易领域进行某种程度的回撤,弄清这种回撤看上去会是什么样子依然至关重要。

The many rounds of trade liberalization after World War II were anchored in two core principles that, in fact, had been adopted by the U.S. in 1934: reciprocity and nondiscrimination. Countries could expect to receive concessions as valuable as those they offered. Most critically, a concession made to one country would automatically be extended to all, under what was called the most-favored-nation rule.

事实上,主导二战后多轮贸易自由化浪潮的两个核心原则,早在1934年就已被美国采纳:互惠和非歧视。给予别国优惠的国家可望得到同等价值的优惠。最关键的是,根据所谓的最惠国原则,给予一国的优惠会自动拓展至所有国家。

The cocktail worked. Notably, the principle of nondiscrimination ensured that a given trading partner could not negotiate a tariff cut with the U.S. and then offer a more favorable deal to another country — undercutting the U.S. competitive position. This broke through a logjam that had stymied previous attempts to liberalize international trade by encouraging countries to make only miserly offers.

这种混合的方式见效了。尤其值得一提的是,非歧视性原则可以确保一个特定的贸易伙伴不能先和美国达成关税减让协议,再给予另一个国家更优惠的条件——进而削弱美国的竞争力。这就打破了一种促使各国仅仅提供吝啬的条件,让早前推动国际贸易自由化的努力受阻的僵局。

The problem is that these principles make for an ill fit with Trump’s worldview, honed in the zero-sum sphere of real estate deal making where one party’s win is the other’s loss.

问题是这些原则与特朗普在房地产交易中形成的世界观不符——那是一个由零和博弈主导的领域,一方赢,另一方就会输。

In trade diplomacy, the objective is to arrive at an agreement that everybody can call a win. “The best way to have a trade commitment enforced is to make it mutually beneficial,” Staiger told me. “If we push to get the very best deal for the United States, we will push other countries to the point that they are indifferent.”

贸易外交的目标是达成对各方都有好处的协议。“让一项贸易承诺得到履行的最好办法,是让它具有多赢性,”史泰格告诉我。“如果我们想方设法达成对美国而言最好的交易,就会逼得其他国家没什么积极性。”

Bilateral trade deficits are not losses. Bilateral surpluses are not gains. They say little about the overall strength or weakness of the economy. “I have a deficit with my grocer and a surplus with my firm,” said Carla A. Hills, the nation’s trade representative during the NAFTA negotiations under the administration of the first President George Bush. “As long as I run my economy properly, I stay above water.”

双边贸易逆差不是损失。双边贸易顺差也不是收益。它们不太能说明总体经济实力的强弱。“我对杂货店存在逆差,对我的公司存在顺差,”曾在乔治·布什(George Bush)总统第一任期作为美方贸易代表参与NAFTA谈判的卡拉·A·希尔斯(Carla A Hills)说,“只要我让自己的经济正常运转,我就不会陷入困境。”

Paradoxically, if Trump wants to reduce the American engagement with global trade, his best bet is to stay within the strictures of the multilateral trading system. The WTO, in fact, does not prevent the U.S. from raising tariffs unilaterally to protect a few industries and their workers. He does not have to convince any of the nation’s trading partners.

吊诡的是,如果特朗普想要让美国减少对国际贸易的参与,那他最好别急于摆脱多边贸易体系的束缚。事实上,WTO并不会阻止美国单方面提高关税,以保护某些产业及其工人。他无需去说服美国的任何贸易伙伴。

All he must accept is that the trading partners would be allowed — after negotiations — to retaliate proportionally by raising barriers against imports from the U.S. “The system allows you to reset your commitments,” Staiger said. “But other countries are also allowed to react.”

他必须接受的只不过是:贸易伙伴们——在谈判过后——可以通过提高进口自美国的商品的关税,适当地进行报复。“这个体系允许你重塑自己的承诺,”史泰格说,“但其他国家也可以做出反应。”

Not unlike the guarantee of reciprocal benefits extended to all, the opportunity for retaliation merely ensures that the U.S. proportionally bears the costs as well as the benefits of its choices. Whether the ultimate objective is more trade or less, it seems like a sensible principle upon which to negotiate. And yet the big risk for the global trading system, and the postwar economic order, is that it is a cost that Trump will refuse to bear.

就像把互惠待遇拓展至所有国家的保证一样,报复的机会既能带来好处,也会招致代价,美国既然做出选择,就得相应地承担结果。不论终极目标是增进贸易还是减少贸易,这看上去都是谈判所要基于的一个明智原则。至于给全球贸易体系和战后经济秩序带来的巨大风险,则会是特朗普拒绝承担的代价。

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