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面对朝鲜,特朗普还有多少选择?

更新时间:2017-7-5 18:31:30 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

For Trump, Threats but Few Options in Confronting North Korea
面对朝鲜,特朗普还有多少选择?

When then-President-elect Trump said on Twitter in early January that a North Korean test of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States “won’t happen!” there were two things that he still did not fully appreciate: how close Kim Jong-un, the North’s leader, was to reaching that goal, and how limited any president’s options were to stop him.

1月初特朗普还是候任总统的时候,他在Twitter上说,朝鲜试验可以打到美国的洲际弹道导弹这种事情“不会发生!”。当时有两件事他不是完全了解:朝鲜领导人金正恩距离这个目标还有多远;任何一个总统在阻止他的时候选择是多么有限。

The ensuing six months have been a brutal education for Mr. Trump. With North Korea’s Tuesday launch, the country has new reach. Experts believe it has crossed the threshold — if just barely — with a missile that appears capable of striking Alaska.

接下来的六个月,特朗普受到了事实的残酷教育。朝鲜周二的试射刷新了该国的导弹覆盖范围。专家们认为,这枚导弹似乎可以打到阿拉斯加,它已经跨过了门槛,虽然只是勉强跨过。

Mr. Kim’s repeated tests show that a more definitive demonstration that he can reach the American mainland cannot be far away, even if it may be a few years before he can fit a nuclear warhead onto his increasingly powerful missiles. But for Mr. Trump and his national security team, Tuesday’s technical milestone simply underscores tomorrow’s strategic dilemma.

金正恩的再三测试表明,不久他就会更加明确地表明他的导弹可以打到美国大陆,虽然把核弹头装在越来越强大的导弹上可能还需要花几年时间。但是,对于特朗普及其国家安全团队来说,周二这个技术上的里程碑只是突显了明天的战略困境。

A North Korean ability to reach the United States, as former Defense Secretary William J. Perry noted recently, “changes every calculus.” The fear is not that Mr. Kim would launch a pre-emptive attack on the West Coast; that would be suicidal, and if the 33-year-old leader has demonstrated anything in his five years in office, he is all about survival. But if Mr. Kim has the potential ability to strike back, it would shape every decision Mr. Trump and his successors will make about defending America’s allies in the region.

正如前国防部长威廉·J·佩里(William J. Perry)最近所说,朝鲜导弹能够打到美国“改变了所有的盘算”。他们担心的不是金正恩会对西海岸发起先发制人的袭击,因为那无异于自杀,如果这位33岁的领导人上任这五年来表现了什么意图,那全部都和求生有关。但是,如果金正恩拥有潜在的反击能力,那就会深刻地影响特朗普及其继任者在该地区维护美国盟友方面的每个决定。

For years, the North has been able to reach South Korea and Japan with ease, and American intelligence officials believe those medium-range missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

多年来,朝鲜的导弹可以轻松打到韩国和日本,美国的情报官员认为这些中程导弹拥有携带核弹头的能力。

But this latest test suggests the United States may already be in range as well, and that, as one former top American intelligence official noted recently, would color every military decision and put enormous pressure on American missile defenses that few trust to work.

但这次最新的测试表明,美国也可能已经在他们的打击范围之内了,正如一位前美国情报官员最近所说,这会影响到美国的每个军事决定,并给美国的导弹防御系统带来巨大的压力,很少有人相信该系统会起作用。

Mr. Trump still has some time. What the North Koreans accomplished while Americans focused on Independence Day celebrations was a breakthrough, but not a vivid demonstration of their nuclear reach.

特朗普还有一些时间来做出反应。朝鲜人在美国人专心庆祝独立日的时候取得的这项成就具有突破性,但并不是对其核能力的生动展现。

Their missile traveled only about 580 miles, by itself no great achievement. But it got there by taking a 1,700-mile trip into space and re-entering the atmosphere, a flight that lasted 37 minutes by the calculation of the United States Pacific Command (and a few minutes longer according to the North Koreans).

朝鲜的这枚导弹只射到了大约580英里(约合933公里)之外,这本身并不是什么巨大成就。但是它飞行了1700英里(约合2736公里)进入太空,然后重新进入大气层,根据美国太平洋司令部的测算,这段行程耗时37分钟(朝鲜人的说法还比那长几分钟)。

Flatten that out, and you have a missile that could reach Alaska, but not Los Angeles. That bolsters the assessment of the director of the Missile Defense Agency, Vice Adm. James D. Syring, who told a congressional hearing last month that the United States “must assume that North Korea can reach us with a ballistic missile.”

把轨迹拉平,导弹就可以打到阿拉斯加了,但到不了洛杉矶。这印证了五角大楼导弹防御局(Missile Defense Agency)局长、海军中将詹姆士·D·叙林( James D. Syring)的估计,上个月他在国会听证会上表示,美国“必须假定朝鲜的弹道导弹可以打到我们”。

Perhaps that is why Mr. Trump has not issued any “red lines” that the North Koreans cannot step over.

也许这就是特朗普没有宣布朝鲜人不能踩过的“红线”的原因。

He has not even repeated the policy that President George W. Bush laid out in October 2006 after the North’s first nuclear test: that he would hold the country “fully accountable” if it shared its nuclear technology with any other nation or terrorist group. Mr. Trump’s advisers say they see little merit in drawing lines that could limit options, and they would rather keep the North guessing.

他甚至没有重申乔治·W·布什(George W. Bush)于2006年10月在朝鲜第一次核试验之后提出的政策:如果它与任何国家或恐怖组织分享核技术,他将让朝鲜负“全部责任”。特朗普的顾问说,划出一条限制自己选择能力的红线没有什么好处,他们宁愿让朝鲜继续猜测他们的应对方式。

So what are Mr. Trump’s options, and what are their downsides?

那么特朗普面前有哪些选择呢?它们各有怎样的缺点呢?

There is classic containment: limiting an adversary’s ability to expand its influence, as the United States did against a much more powerful foe, the Soviet Union. But that does not solve the problem; it is just a way of living with it.

一个老办法是遏制:限制对手扩大影响的能力,就像美国对抗更强大的敌人苏联那样。但这个做法并不能解决问题;它只是一种忍耐方式。

He could step up sanctions, bolster the American naval presence off the Korean Peninsula — “we’re sending an armada,” he boasted in April — and accelerate the secret American cyberprogram to sabotage missile launches. But if that combination of intimidation and technical wizardry had been a success, Mr. Kim would not have conducted the test on Tuesday, knowing that it would lead only to more sanctions, more military pressure and more covert activity — and perhaps persuade China that it has no choice but to intervene more decisively.

他可以加强制裁,加强美国在朝鲜半岛周围海军力量的部署——他曾在4月的时候夸口说,“我们会派出一支舰队”——并且增强美国破坏导弹发射的秘密网络项目。但如果这些威胁和技术魔法取得了成功,金正恩就不会在周二进行这次试验了,因为他明知这会引发更多制裁、更大的军事压力和更多的秘密行动——或许还可以说服中国它别无选择,只能更坚决地进行干预。

So far, Mr. Trump’s early enthusiasm that he had cajoled China’s president, Xi Jinping, to crack down on the North has resulted in predictable disappointment. Recently, he told Mr. Xi that the United States was prepared to go it alone in confronting North Korea, but the Chinese may consider that an empty threat.

截至目前,特朗普最初劝诱中国国家主席习近平对朝鲜进行制裁的热情不出所料地带来了令人失望的结果。最近,他告诉习近平美国准备独自应对朝鲜,但中国或许会认为这不过是虚张声势。

He could also take another step and threaten pre-emptive military strikes if the United States detects an imminent launch of a intercontinental ballistic missile — maybe one intended to demonstrate the potential reach to the West Coast. Mr. Perry argued for that step in 2006, in an op-ed in The Washington Post that he wrote with a future defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter. “If North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy” the missile on the pad, the two men wrote.

他也可以采取另一种措施,威胁如果美国一探测到朝鲜要发射洲际弹道导弹,便会发起先发制人的军事打击——朝鲜可能会发射一枚,以证明自己有将导弹发射到美国西海岸的潜在能力。佩里与后来担任国防部长的阿什顿·B·卡特(Ashton B. Carter)在2006年一起为《华盛顿邮报》(The Washington Post)撰写的一篇专栏文章中,他曾主张采取这种措施。“如果朝鲜继续做发射导弹的准备,美国应该立即表明”它会把导弹“打击和破坏”在发射台上,两人写道。

But Mr. Perry noted recently that “even if you think it was a good idea at the time,” and he now seems to have his doubts, “it’s not a good idea today.”

但佩里最近指出,“就算当时觉得那是个好主意”,现在似乎也有点怀疑“它在今天不是个好主意了”。

The reason is simple: In the intervening 11 years, the North has built too many missiles, of too many varieties, to make the benefits of a strike like that worth the risk. It has test-flown a new generation of solid-fuel missiles, which can be easily hidden in mountain caves and rolled out for quick launch. And the North Koreans still possess their ultimate weapon of retaliation: artillery along the northern edge of the Demilitarized Zone that can take out the South’s capital, Seoul, a city of approximately 10 million people and one of the most vibrant economic hubs of Asia.

原因很简单:在这11年时间里,朝鲜制造出种类繁多、数量很大的导弹,使得进行那样一场打击变得风险太大而不值得一试。朝鲜已经试射了新一代的固体燃料导弹,它们可以很容易地隐藏在山洞里,又能很快进行发射。而且朝鲜依然掌握着终极报复武器:部署在非军事区北侧的炮火足以毁掉韩国的首都首尔,那是一个人口约1000万的城市,也是亚洲最活跃的经济中心之一。

In short, that is a risk the North Koreans are betting even Mr. Trump, for all his threats, would not take. “A conflict in North Korea,” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said on CBS’s “Face the Nation” in May, “would be probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.”

简而言之就是存在这样一种风险,即朝鲜在押注特朗普尽管做出各种威胁,但并不会采取行动。“朝鲜半岛冲突,”国防部长吉姆·马蒂斯(Jim Mattis)今年5月曾在CBS电视台《面对国民》(Face the Nation)节目中说,“可能会是大多数人一生中面临的最严重的斗争。”

Which leads to the next option, the one that South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, talked about in Washington on Friday when he visited Mr. Trump: negotiation. It would start with a freeze in North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in return for an American agreement to limit or suspend military exercises with South Korea. Mr. Xi has long urged that approach, and it won an endorsement on Tuesday from President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, after he met with the Chinese leader.

这就说到了美国的下一个选项,也就是韩国新任总统文在寅(Moon Jae-in)周五在华盛顿与特朗普会面时谈论过的:谈判。首先是争取朝鲜暂停核项目与导弹试验,以换取美国同意限制或暂停与韩国的军事演习。习近平一直竭力主张采取这种办法,周二这一策略又赢得了俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·V·普京(Vladimir V. Putin)的支持,后者刚刚与习近平进行了会面。

That, too, carries risks. It essentially achieves the North Korean and Chinese goal of limiting American military freedom of action in the Pacific, and over time erodes the quality of the American-South Korean military deterrent.

这种选择也有风险。它本质上实现了朝鲜和中国的目标,即限制美国在亚太地区的军事行动自由,渐渐削弱美韩军事威慑的质量。

Negotiations with the North are hardly a new idea: Bill Clinton tried it in 1994, and Mr. Bush in the last two years of his term. But both discovered that over time, once the North Koreans determined that the economic benefits were limited, the deals fell apart.

与朝鲜进行谈判谈不上是什么新点子:比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)在1994年尝试过,布什总统在自己任期的最后两年也尝试过。但他们后来都发现,一旦朝鲜觉得自己获得的经济好处有限,交易就会告吹。

Moreover, a freeze at this late date, when the North is estimated to have 10 to 20 nuclear weapons, essentially acknowledges that the North’s modest arsenal is here to stay.

此外,据估计,朝鲜已经拥有10到20枚核武器,到这个时候再暂停核项目,基本上是认可朝鲜规模不算太大的核武库将在朝鲜半岛保留下来。

Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said as much when he visited Seoul in mid-March and told reporters that he would most likely reject any solution that would enshrine “a comprehensive set of capabilities” in the North. He has since softened his public comments. Administration officials now suggest that a freeze would not be a solution, but a way station to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula — in other words, an agreement that Mr. Kim would give up all his nuclear weapons and missiles.

美国国务卿雷克斯·W·蒂勒森(Rex W. Tillerson)在3月中访问首尔时也表达过这样的观点,他告诉记者自己很可能会反对任何将“一整套能力”珍藏供奉在朝鲜的决策。在那之后,他的公开言论有所软化。政府官员现在表示,暂停核项目不是一种解决办法,而是通向朝鲜半岛无核化的一个站点——换句话说,那意味着一项令金正恩放弃所有核武器和导弹的协议。

But it is now clear that Mr. Kim has no interest in giving up that power. As he looks around the world, he sees cases like that of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya — an authoritarian who gave up his nascent nuclear program, only to be deposed, with American help, as soon as his people turned against him. That is what Mr. Kim believes his nuclear program will prevent — an American effort to topple him.

但目前金正恩显然对放弃这种权力没有兴趣。环视全世界,他看到的是利比亚的穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲上校(Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi)的例子——这位放弃了自己刚刚发展起来的核项目的独裁者,一遭到民众的反对,便在美国的协助下被推翻了。这正是金正恩认为自己的核武器项目可以防止的事情——美国推翻他的努力。

He may be right.

他的想法有可能是对的。

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