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美国为何对朝鲜心存幻想?

更新时间:2017-5-18 19:51:58 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

Why Do We Appease North Korea?
美国为何对朝鲜心存幻想?

With its first successful test on Sunday of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, North Korea stands on the verge of becoming a complete and verifiable nuclear power that poses a direct threat to the United States. This latest act of defiance came just days after the swearing-in of Moon Jae-in as president of South Korea and hours before China’s celebration of a $1 trillion international infrastructure project called “One Belt, One Road.”

周日首次成功试射一枚中程弹道导弹的朝鲜,即将成为一个真正意义上的、可证实的核国家,对美国构成直接威胁。这个最新的挑衅行动发生在文在寅(Moon Jae-in)宣誓就任韩国总统几天后,中国庆祝投资一万亿美元的“一带一路”跨国基础设施项目几个小时前。

Pyongyang’s countless provocations since the Korean War have never set off a meaningful punitive response. Even in egregious cases like assassination attempts against South Korean leaders or the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane in international airspace in 1969, the United States and its allies have answered with restraint.

自朝鲜战争以来,平壤不计其数的挑衅从来没有引起充分的惩罚性回应。即便是在试图暗杀韩国领导人或1969年在国际空域击落美国的一架侦察机这样的极端情况下,美国及其盟友的回应也颇为克制。

Since the early 1990s, American presidents have treated the growing threat of the North Korean nuclear program as a priority — but one to be dealt with later. North Korea’s deep poverty and the apparent clownish nature of its leaders have sustained the illusion that its nuclear program could be bought out, the regime itself could be waited out, and that its largely concealed crimes against humanity could be tuned out.

从90年代初开始,美国总统便把日渐加剧的朝鲜核计划威胁作为头等大事,但后来才开始处理。朝鲜的极度贫困,以及其领导人看似胡闹的表现,让外界一直存有幻想,认为可以用钱让朝鲜放弃核计划,可以坐等朝鲜政权自己灭亡,可以对基本上被遮掩起来的反人类罪行充耳不闻。

While the United States has vacillated between expedient deals, halfhearted sanctions, pleas to China for greater intervention and doing nothing, the North has methodically advanced its nuclear arsenal and missile capacity.

无论是达成权宜的协议、半心半意的制裁、请求中国加大干预力度,还是什么都不做,美国的政策在不断摇摆,与此同时朝鲜有条不紊地提高了自己的核武器和导弹实力。

Washington’s 1994 deal with North Korea froze its plutonium-based weapons program for eight years, but that agreement came at the price of ignoring that the North was developing all along an alternative uranium-based program. Pyongyang’s first long-range missile test in 1998 led to the Clinton administration’s re-engagement of the North, upon which Washington gave about $300 million worth of food aid in return for inspecting an empty cave suspected of storing nuclear matériel.

华盛顿1994年与朝鲜达成的协议,让其以钚为基础的武器计划冻结了八年,但代价是无视朝鲜一直在发展以铀为基础的替代计划。1998年,平壤首次进行远程导弹试验,促使华盛顿再次与朝鲜达成协议。根据该协议,华盛顿提供了价值约为三亿美元的粮食援助,换来的是检查一个被怀疑存有核物料的空洞穴。

The Bush administration showed even less backbone. After Pyongyang’s first nuclear test, in 2006, Washington, distracted by the war in Iraq, lifted targeted financial sanctions on Pyongyang, returned to nuclear talks, turned a blind eye to the North’s construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria, resumed food aid, and removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

布什政府表现出的胆量甚至更小。在平壤2006年首次进行核试验后,注意力被伊拉克战争分散的华盛顿取消了对平壤的针对性金融制裁,重启核谈判,无视朝鲜在叙利亚修建核反应堆,恢复粮食援助,并把朝鲜从支持恐怖主义的国家名单中移出。

While the Obama administration was less prone to making concessions, Pyongyang took a great leap forward in its weapons programs by conducting four nuclear tests and four long-range missile tests.

奥巴马政府不那么愿意做出让步,但通过四次核试验和四次远程导弹试验,朝鲜的武器计划取得了巨大的飞跃。

Through each of Pyongyang’s tests, American policy makers have harbored the hope that Beijing would come around and put real pressure on the regimes of Kim Jong-un and his father, Kim Jong-il.

在平壤的每一次试验中,美国的政策制定者都希望北京会改变主意,给金正恩(Kim Jong-un)和其父金正日(Kim Jong-il)的政权施加真正的压力。

Although most North Koreans are cut off from the global economy, the regime elite remains beholden to international finance for moving proceeds from weapons trafficking. Pyongyang’s international currency of choice is the United States dollar.

尽管大部分朝鲜人都被排除在全球经济之外,但朝鲜政权的精英依然受惠于国际金融,通过它来转移武器贩卖的收入。平壤首选的国际货币是美元。

North Korea is the only state known to counterfeit dollars as a matter of state policy. And the United States has largely declined to go after the Kim regime’s money trail because of concerns that doing so would push Pyongyang to escalate its provocations.

朝鲜是唯一一个已知把伪造美元作为国策的国家。美国基本不愿追究金氏政权的资金行踪,因为担心这么做会促使平壤升级挑衅行为。

The Trump administration needs to hit Pyongyang with the kind of devastating targeted financial sanctions — including secondary sanctions against its foreign partners — that brought Iran to the negotiating table. In fact, it is mandated to do so by the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, which took effect in 2016.

特朗普政府须采用毁灭性的精确金融打击,包括针对其外国合作伙伴的二级制裁。正是这种制裁让伊朗回到了谈判桌旁。实际上,2016年生效的《对朝鲜制裁和政策强化法》(North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act)规定美国有权这么做。

Pyongyang’s volatility, however, has deterred full enforcement. Sanctions enforcement, like domestic law enforcement, takes much work and time. Even a full-throttled effort is unlikely to yield results in the first couple of years. But until the United States inflicts a hard financial blow on the Kim regime by freezing its funds in offshore accounts, Washington will lack sufficient leverage for negotiations to be effective.

然而,平壤的多变阻碍了制裁的彻底执行。执行制裁和执行国内法律一样,需要做大量工作,投入大量时间。即便得到彻底执行,制裁也不太可能在前几年取得成果。但除非美国通过冻结金氏政权的离岸账户资金,在金融上给它沉重的一击,否则华盛顿就缺乏足够砝码去展开有成效的谈判。

With equal determination, the United States should overhaul its efforts to reach the North Korean people. Pyongyang does its best to block information, censor speech and monopolize knowledge. The state’s invasive practices range from lifelong ideological indoctrination to life-ending punishment for thought crimes like watching video recordings of South Korean dramas or using illegal cellular phones.

美国应该怀着同等的决心,重新审视对朝鲜民众的宣传行动。平壤尽全力封锁信息、审查言论和垄断知识。朝鲜政府的手段是无所不在的,从伴随一生的意识形态灌输,到可以因为观看韩剧录像或使用非法的移动电话等思想罪而结束一个人的生命。

Yet the United States budget for radio broadcasting into North Korea via Voice of America has diminished over the past decade. Such broadcasts make a difference: Approximately three-quarters of North Koreans who fled to freedom in the South in 2009 had been exposed to foreign media.

但过去十年里,美国通过美国之音(Voice of America)向朝鲜进行无线电广播的预算减少。这种广播是有意义的:2009年逃往韩国寻求自由的朝鲜人中,大约四分之三接触过外国媒体。

The United States must sustain these efforts until the Kim regime’s denuclearization and dismantling of gulags are verified. The regime will step away from its nuclear program only when sustained financial pressure creates the specter of revolt or regime collapse, at which point Washington must negotiate a way out for the Kims.

美国必须坚持这些努力,直到金氏政权的无核化和劳改营拆除得到核实。只有当持续的金融压力造成对民众反抗或政权崩溃的恐惧时,朝鲜政权才会放弃核计划。届时,华盛顿必须通过谈判,为金氏家族找到一条出路。

Any agreement with Pyongyang short of these measures or premature relaxation of sanctions would mean yet again placing blind trust in the Kim regime’s good faith.

与朝鲜达成任何不包含这些措施的协议,或提前放宽制裁,都意味着再一次盲目信任金氏政权的诚意。

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