您现在的位置: 纽约时报中英文网 >> 纽约时报中英文版 >> 国际 >> 正文

先发制人打击朝鲜的风险有多大

更新时间:2017-3-21 11:40:33 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

The Risks of Pre-emptive Strikes Against North Korea
先发制人打击朝鲜的风险有多大

A declaration by Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson that the United States would consider pre-emptive military action against North Korea raises a question that has dogged American military planners for 20 years: How could this be made to work?

美国国务卿雷克斯·W·蒂勒森(Rex W. Tillerson)宣布,美国会考虑对朝鲜采取先发制人的军事行动,这就提出了一个已经困扰美国军事规划者20年的问题:怎么才能使这种行动奏效?

The United States has long threatened force. The sincerity of such threats has always been ambiguous, as they are often meant less to prepare for war than to act as a deterrent to North Korea and a reassurance of the commitment by the United States to South Korea.

美国威胁使用武力由来已久。这种威胁的可信度一直不明确,因为它们往往更多地是作为对朝鲜的威慑、以及美国对韩国承诺的保证,而不是意味着为战争作准备。

But there is a reason that, even as North Korea’s weapons programs have passed red line after red line, the United States has never followed through.

然而,尽管朝鲜的武器计划一次又一次地跨越红线,美国却从未付诸武力,这是有原因的。

Almost any plan would bring a high risk of unintended escalation to all-out war, analysts believe. It would place millions of South Korean and Japanese civilians in the cross hairs of North Korean weapons with few guaranteed benefits.

分析人士认为,几乎任何计划都有很高的意外升级为全面战争的风险。这将让数百万韩国和日本平民成为朝鲜武器的目标,但却几乎不能保证会有益处。

That officials would even raise a pre-emptive attack shows the growing severity of the crisis, but the problems associated with any such plan demonstrate why that crisis has remained unsolved for two decades.

官员们甚至会提出先发制人行动,这本身就表明了危机的日益严重性,但是,任何与这种计划所关联的问题也说明,为什么这场危机20年来仍未得到解决。

Three Unappealing Choices

三种不诱人的选择

A pre-emptive attack can generally mean one of three things. Mr. Tillerson, in keeping with past American statements, did not clarify which of those options were on the table but ruled none of them out.

先发制人行动通常意味着三种选择之一。蒂勒森按照美国过去声明的做法,没有阐明正在考虑这些选择中的哪种,他也没有排除其中任何一种。

Here is a brief guide to each:

下面简要介绍一下每种选择:

1. A Single Strike to Halt a Missile Launch

1. 旨在阻止导弹袭击的一次性打击

How it would work: Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in September at the Council on Foreign Relations that such an attack would be more “self-defense” than pre-emption.

可能的做法:参谋长联席会议前主席迈克·穆伦(Mike Mullen)去年9月在外交关系委员会上说,这种打击在更大程度上是“自卫”,而不是先发制人。

If North Korea appears poised to launch a nuclear-armed missile, he said, American strikes could “take out launch capabilities on the launchpad or take them out once they’re launched.”

他说,如果朝鲜好像处于准备发射带有核武器的导弹的状态,美国的打击可以“在发射台上铲除导弹发射能力,或者一旦导弹已经发射马上将其击毁”。

The challenge: It may not be so easy as hitting launchpads out in the open. In wartime, North Korea would probably use mobile launchers, hidden around the country in locations such as tunnels. Striking every launcher before it could be used would be difficult.

这种选择的挑战:与打击公开的发射台相比,这可能并不那么容易。在战时,朝鲜可能会使用隐藏在全国不同地点、比如隧道里的移动发射器。在所有的发射器使用之前将其击毁会很困难。

The risk: This would almost certainly be too late to prevent all nuclear missiles from getting off the ground and, given that missile defense is no guarantee, through to their targets.

这种选择的风险:考虑到导弹防御系统并不确保安全,这对阻止所有核导弹升空、并飞向目标来说,几乎可以肯定是为时过晚。

2. A Set of Strikes to Devastate the Arsenal

2. 旨在彻底毁灭武器库的一系列打击

How it would work: Striking nuclear and missile facilities would delay the programs and pressure Pyongyang to surrender them. Cyberattacks, launched alongside or instead of physical attacks, could sabotage the programs and disrupt the military command.

可能的做法:打击核设施和导弹设施会推迟朝鲜的核导计划,迫使平壤将其放弃。单独使用、或与实地打击同时发动的网络攻击,可能毁坏核导计划、扰乱军事指挥。

The challenge: Because North Korea’s program is indigenous rather than imported from abroad, the country has the know-how to replace destroyed facilities, making setbacks temporary. It would be difficult to strike existing missiles hidden around the country, most likely leaving much of the threat in place.

挑战:由于朝鲜的核导计划是土生土长的,不是从国外引进的,朝鲜有技术能力去修复被毁坏的设施,这会使计划受到的挫折是暂时的。打击隐藏在全国各地的现有导弹会很困难,很可能让许多现存威胁继续保留下去。

The risk: Even a limited attack would probably prompt retaliation. An attack broad enough to seriously degrade the program could provoke North Korean fears of an invasion or an assassination attempt, potentially leading to all-out war.

风险:即使是有限的打击也可能会导致报复。足以严重破坏朝鲜核导计划的大范围打击,可能引起朝鲜人对入侵或暗杀企图的恐惧,因此有导致全面战争的潜在可能。

3. A War Launched on American Terms

3. 按美国的条件发动战争

How it would work: The United States would initiate a war to destroy the North Korean government outright, much as in Iraq in 2003.

可能的做法:美国发动一场彻底摧毁朝鲜政府的战争,就像2003年在伊拉克那样。

The challenge: North Korea’s war plans are thought to call for extensive nuclear strikes to halt any invasion.

挑战:人们认为,朝鲜的战争计划要求进行大范围的核打击,以制止任何入侵行动。

The risk: North Korea would almost certainly succeed in launching some nuclear and chemical weapons, potentially killing millions.

风险:朝鲜几乎肯定会成功地发射一些核武器和化学武器,有导致百万人死亡的潜在可能。

Any plan faces a common set of problems that are both essential to overcome and, so far, have proved insurmountable.

任何计划都面临着一系列的共同问题,克服这些问题极其重要,但迄今为止,它们都被证明尚不可克服。

The Retaliation Problem

报复问题

For all of the United States’ military superiority, North Korea has one significant advantage: its willingness to accept risk.

虽然美国有很大的军事优势,但朝鲜有一个明显的有利因素:它愿意接受风险。

This allows the country to retaliate against any limited strikes by imposing costs that are disproportionately difficult for its adversaries to bear.

这让朝鲜能够对任何有限的打击进行报复,做法是给对手制造远远高出其可承受的代价。

North Korea can retaliate, for instance, by launching cyberattacks, as it is suspected to have done in 2013 against South Korea’s banking system and in 2014 against Sony Pictures.

朝鲜能使用的报复方法包括发动网络攻击,正如人们怀疑它2013年对韩国的银行系统、以及2014年对索尼影业所做的那样。

It can stir up the risk of conflict, as it did with provocations in 2013. This benefits North Korea’s leadership, rallying citizens around the state narrative of a glorious struggle. American, South Korean and Japanese civilians are less willing to accept the looming threat of war.

朝鲜还能搅起冲突的风险,正如它2013年的挑衅那样。这对朝鲜的领导层有利,让朝鲜人民在国家光荣斗争的旗帜下团结起来。美国、韩国和日本的老百姓则不太愿意接受即将来临的战争威胁。

Mark Fitzpatrick, a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote on the think tank’s website that strike plans could face heavy opposition from South Korean and Japanese leaders, whose citizens “would bear the brunt of the retaliation.” That opposition could limit American military options.

国际战略研究所(International Institute for Strategic Studies)的学者马克·菲茨帕特里克(Mark Fitzpatrick)在该智库的网站上写道,打击计划可能会受到来自韩国和日本领导人的强烈反对,他们的公民“会成为报复行动首当其冲的受害者”。这种反对可能限制美国的军事选择。

The country has also shown willingness to use violence that falls just under the threshold for war, for example shelling a South Korean island and sinking a South Korean ship, both in 2010.

朝鲜也已表明愿意使用刚刚够不上战争的暴力,比如它曾在2010年炮击一个韩国岛屿,还击沉了一艘韩国军舰。

Many analysts believe that the recent assassination of Kim Jong-un’s half brother, by VX nerve agent in the Kuala Lumpur international airport, was intended, in part, as a demonstration of North Korea’s willingness to use chemical weapons abroad and in civilian areas.

许多分析人士认为,金正恩的同父异母哥哥最近在吉隆坡国际机场被人用VX神经毒剂暗杀一事,其部分目的就是要表明朝鲜愿意在国外、以及在有平民的地方使用化学武器。

Any limited American attack plan would have to assume such retaliation — a potentially high cost to pay for strikes that would probably impose only temporary delays on the country’s nuclear development.

美国的任何有限打击计划都必须假设会发生这种报复,这对可能只会暂时推迟朝鲜核进展的打击来说,是一个潜在的高昂代价。

The Escalation Problem

升级问题

North Korea knows it would probably lose any war. Should one occur, its plans call for a full-scale, last-ditch retaliation to stop the Americans in their tracks.

朝鲜知道它打不赢任何战争。如果战争发生,它的计划是进行全面的、孤注一掷的报复,以此来迫使美国人停下来。

This strategy, borne of desperation, creates a risk that has long chastened American war planners: that North Korea would perceive even a limited strike as the start of a war and respond with its full arsenal.

这种出于绝望的战略,制造了一个长期困扰美国战争规划者的风险:那就是,朝鲜可能会把就连有限的打击也当作是战争的开始,并用自己的全部武器库做出反应。

Jeffrey Lewis, a North Korea expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, recalled a 1969 episode in which North Korea shot down a United States Navy plane, killing 31.

明德大学蒙特雷国际研究学院(Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey)的朝鲜问题专家杰弗里·刘易斯(Jeffrey Lewis)回忆了1969年的一段往事,当时,朝鲜击落了一架美国海军飞机,导致31人丧生。

The Nixon administration, he said, never retaliated because it could find no options that were “tough enough to punish the North Koreans, but not so tough that the North Koreans will think it’s a general attack,” setting off an all-out war.

他说,尼克松政府从未报复,因为政府找不到一种“强硬到足以惩罚朝鲜人,但又不够强硬,不至于让朝鲜人认为是总进攻”,从而引发一场全面战争的选择。

That has been the problem ever since, Mr. Lewis said: “News flash, these Venn diagrams do not overlap.”

这是自那时以来一直存在的问题,刘易斯说:“突发新闻和这些文氏图没有重叠。”

As North Korea’s nuclear capability has grown, the distance between a single attack and all-out war has shortened. Paradoxically, the heightened fear of escalation also makes it likelier.

随着朝鲜核能力的增长,一次性打击与全面战争之间的距离缩短了。矛盾的是,对升级的恐惧的增加也使得升级的可能性变大。

“If there were ever a conflict, Pyongyang would have nowhere else to go but up the escalation ladder after artillery except to its nuclear weapons,” Victor Cha, who served as the Asian affairs director on George W. Bush’s National Security Council, wrote in a September column in a South Korean newspaper.

“如果发生冲突,在除了其核武器以外的东西受到打击之后,平壤除了升级将别无选择,”曾在乔治·W·布什(George W. Bush)的国家安全委员会担任亚洲事务负责人的车维德(Victor Cha)去年9月在韩国一家报纸发表的专栏文章中说。

That threat goes both ways, Mr. Cha wrote, because it “compels the United States to pre-emptively attack the nuclear forces at the first sign of conflict.”

车维德写道,这种威胁是相互的,因为它“迫使美国在看到冲突发生的第一迹象时,先发制人地打击核武力”。

A full war, entered deliberately or accidentally, would risk terrible costs.

不管是有意、还是无意发动全面战争都会带有产生可怕代价的风险。

Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti told a congressional committee in 2016, when he was commander of United States forces in South Korea, that war with North Korea “would be more akin to the Korean War and World War II — very complex, probably high casualty.”

时任美国驻韩国军队指挥官的柯蒂斯·M·斯卡帕罗蒂上将(Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti)2016年曾对国会的一个委员会说,与朝鲜作战“会更像是朝鲜战争和第二次世界大战,会非常复杂,可能有很高的伤亡”。

Analysts doubt that the United States could reproduce the rapid military victory it achieved against Iraq in 2003. In the event of war, North Korean plans are thought to call for nuclear attacks against major ports and air bases in South Korea and Japan, halting any American invasion before it could fully begin.

分析人士对美国可以重获在2003年的伊拉克战争中取得的那种快速军事胜利表示怀疑。人们认为,一旦发生战争,朝鲜的计划要求对韩国和日本的主要港口和空军基地进行核打击,这会在任何美国入侵全面开始之前让其止步。

In the meantime, nuclear and chemical strikes against major population centers would be intended to shock the world into capitulating. Missile defense would be of limited use against short-range rockets and of no use against North Korea’s hundreds of artillery pieces, many of which target Seoul, the South Korean capital.

与此同时,为了震惊世界、令其屈服,朝鲜会对主要人口中心进行核袭击和化学武器袭击。导弹防御对短程火箭的作用有限,对朝鲜的数百枚火炮毫无用处,许多这些火炮是针对韩国首都首尔的。

The Strategy Problem

战略问题

Potentially the hardest question of all is whether such plans would achieve American strategic aims.

最困难的潜在问题是,这种计划是否能实现美国的战略目标。

Military strikes may be an imperfect tool, analysts say, for solving what is essentially a political problem: the leadership’s belief that it requires an advanced nuclear program to survive.

分析人士说,用于解决本质上属于政治范畴的问题,军事打击也许是一个不完美的工具,朝鲜领导层认为,为了生存,它需要有一个先进的核计划。

Strikes short of war would risk deepening, rather than altering, this calculus. Strikes that led to war would risk exactly the nuclear exchange they are meant to forestall.

未达到战争级别的军事打击会加深、而不是改变这种考虑。导致战争的军事打击,则恰恰会冒下这种打击本欲阻止的核交火的风险。

Yet the United States has long maintained attack plans, illustrating the growing urgency of the North Korean crisis as well as how difficult it has become to solve.

然而,美国长期以来一直保持着打击计划的事实,既表明了朝鲜危机日益增长的紧迫感,也表明了解决这些问题的难度。

“It’s a bad strategic idea, but you can understand why military planners would gravitate toward it,” Mr. Lewis said, calling the plans “the best of a bad lot.”

“这是一个糟糕的战略理念,但你可以理解为什么军事规划者会被它所吸引,”刘易斯说,他称这些选择是“坏东西堆里挑出的最好的”。

“全文请访问纽约时报中文网,本文发表于纽约时报中文网(http://cn.nytimes.com),版权归纽约时报公司所有。任何单位及个人未经许可,不得擅自转载或翻译。订阅纽约时报中文网新闻电邮:http://nytcn.me/subscription/”

相关文章列表