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蒂勒森能通过朝鲜核危机的考验吗

更新时间:2017-3-17 10:31:32 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

Will Rex Tillerson Pass North Korea’s Nuclear Test?
蒂勒森能通过朝鲜核危机的考验吗

Since the early 1990s, American administrations have tried and failed to curb North Korea’s growing nuclear ambitions. Over the past year, Kim Jong-un, the country’s leader, has relentlessly accelerated the effort to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that can strike the United States with a nuclear payload. Two nuclear tests and 30 missile launches later, North Korea is closer than ever to putting that capacity in the hands of a leader who seems to act impulsively, even irrationally, and may not be bound by the rules of deterrence.

自从1990年代初以来,美国政府遏制朝鲜日益增长的核野心的努力均宣告失败。过去一年间,朝鲜领导人金正恩(Kim Jong-un)不断加紧研发一种洲际弹道导弹,用它可以搭载核弹头对美国发起攻击。在进行两次核试验并发射30枚导弹之后,朝鲜领导人离这种能力已经前所未有地接近,而这名领导人的行事似乎毫无章法乃至理性,可能会无视核威慑的规则。

What is to be done about Mr. Kim and the nuclear nightmare he inspires? As Rex Tillerson travels to Asia this week for the first time as secretary of state, his mission should be to build support for a plan to contend with this threat. South Korea’s political turmoil — including the ouster last week of Park Geun-hye as president — only complicates Mr. Tillerson’s already difficult task.

该拿金正恩以及由他引发的核噩梦怎么办?当雷克斯·蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)于本周首次以国务卿的身份到访亚洲时,他的任务应该是为一个对抗这种威胁的计划争取支持。韩国的政治动荡——包括朴槿惠(Park Geun-hye)于上周被免去总统职务——只会让蒂勒森的艰巨任务变得更为复杂。

There is no quick military fix. Much of North Korea’s nuclear complex is concealed underground, inside mountains or in places unknown to United States intelligence. Meanwhile, the country is making rapid progress with mobile missiles powered by solid rocket fuel that can be rolled out of hiding and prepared for launch in minutes. Similarly, most experts believe cyberweapons can at best disrupt and delay but not defeat Pyongyang’s missile program.

不存在立竿见影的军事解决方案。朝鲜的很多核设施都隐藏在地下、山里或者美国情报机构不知道的地方。与此同时,朝鲜正在以固体火箭燃料提供动力的机动型导弹方面取得快速进展,这种导弹可以从隐蔽处运出,在几分钟内做好发射准备。同样,大多数专家都认为,网络武器最多只能干扰和拖延,而不能挫败平壤的导弹计划。

Even if we had an effective pre-emptive strike capacity, the consequences of using it could be prohibitive. Pyongyang possesses thousands of artillery pieces 30 miles from Seoul. Just one retaliatory salvo could decimate South Korea’s capital.

即便我们有能力发起有效的先制打击,运用这种能力的后果也会令人不寒而栗。平壤在距离首尔30英里的地方部署了成千上万的火炮。只需一次报复性的炮击就可以让韩国首都伤亡惨重。

That leaves a negotiated settlement that first freezes and then rolls back North Korea’s nuclear program, with inspectors to carefully scrutinize compliance — much as we did with Iran. While a monitored freeze would leave North Korea’s existing capacity in place, it would stop the testing critical to further progress, enhance our knowledge of the program and create time and space to pursue a comprehensive agreement. Such an agreement could include the peace treaty Pyongyang wants, provided it effectively denuclearizes.

剩下的就是通过谈判达成协议,先冻结再遏制朝鲜的核计划,让核查人员仔细审查其合规性——很像我们处理伊朗核问题的方式。受到监督的冻结核计划之举,不会让朝鲜失去现有的能力,但可以防止其开展那些对于取得更大进展至关重要的试验,使得我们对其计划更加了解,还可以为寻求达成一项全面协议创造时间和空间。这项协议可能会包含平壤方面想要的和平条约,只要它切实推进无核化。

Mr. Kim’s grandfather and father both proved willing to negotiate — they saw the nuclear program as a bargaining chip. Kim Jong-un has refused — to him, nuclear weapons are the only insurance policy against regime change. What, if anything, can change his strategic calculus?

事实证明,金正恩的祖父和父亲都乐于谈判——他们把核计划视为谈判筹码。金正恩则拒绝谈判——对他来说,核武器是防止政权变更的唯一保险。有什么东西能改变他的战略盘算吗?

The answer is a comprehensive, sustained and relentless international pressure campaign, led by the United States, South Korea, Japan and China, that raises the price of Mr. Kim’s obstinacy to the point that he believes his survival is in jeopardy.

答案是一项由美国、韩国、日本和中国引领,全面、持久而严厉的国际施压行动,要让金正恩为自己的顽固付出更高代价,要让他觉得自己的生存受到了威胁。

The Obama administration started such a campaign that continues today, though less intensively. Its most visible component is China, North Korea’s largest trade and investment partner. By curbing imports from North Korea — as it did with coal, which generates one-third of Pyongyang’s export revenues — Beijing can exert unique leverage, denying Mr. Kim resources to fund his nuclear pursuits and buy off elites.

奥巴马政府发起了这样一场行动,一直持续到今天,尽管不那么有力。其中最引人注目的因素就是中国,朝鲜最大的贸易和投资伙伴。北京通过限制从朝鲜进口商品——譬如已经暂停从朝鲜进口煤炭,而煤炭为朝鲜贡献了三分之一的出口收入——可以施加独特的影响力,让金正恩失去用以支撑其核野心和收买精英的财力。

The second component of the pressure campaign has been less visible, but just as vital. Working in weekly coordination with South Korea and Japan, the United States identified and then sought to sever the political, economic and diplomatic ties that North Korea enjoys around the world. Quietly but systematically, we went from country to country in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. We pressed each to eject North Korean guest workers whose remittances go not to their families but to help fund the military, and diplomats engaged in illicit commercial activities; to deny landing rights to Air Koryo, the national airline, and porting rights to North Korea’s ships; to cut off or downgrade diplomatic relations; and to aggressively enforce and even go beyond sanctions authorized by the United Nations Security Council. To date, our efforts have cut in half high-level North Korean exchanges with other countries and possibly deprived North Korea of several hundred million dollars in revenues.

施压行动的第二个元素不那么引人注目,但也很关键。美国每周都与日韩展开协调行动,发现并设法斩断朝鲜在世界各地的政治、经济和外交关系。我们低调而又系统地与亚洲、非洲、中东和欧洲的一个又一个国家取得联系。我们敦促每一个国家驱逐来自朝鲜的外籍劳工——他们汇回国的工钱不会进入家人的口袋,而会被用于为军队提供资金支持——以及从事非法商业活动的朝鲜外交官;拒绝给予朝鲜国营航空公司高丽航空(Air Koryo)着陆权,拒绝给予朝鲜船只停靠权;与朝鲜断交或调降外交关系级别;积极执行联合国安理会的制裁决议,甚至可以额外采取制裁措施。至今,我们的努力让朝鲜与其他国家的高层交往减少了一半,还可能让朝鲜损失了几亿美元的收入。

Mr. Tillerson should make clear that the United States will continue this dogged, daily diplomacy for the purpose of bringing North Korea back to credible negotiations. But he will have to grapple with the likelihood that post-impeachment elections in South Korea this May will empower a new leadership with a much more lenient approach toward Pyongyang. His saving grace may be Kim Jong-un’s inability to resist a new round of provocative actions.

蒂勒森应该明确表示,为了推动朝鲜重新参加切实有效的谈判,美国会继续采取这种顽强的常态化的外交策略。但他将不得不应对的一种可能性是:朴槿惠被弹劾后,一名对平壤态度较温和的新领导人在韩国今年5月的大选中脱颖而出。他的救命稻草或许会是金正恩无力抗拒发起新一轮挑衅行动的诱惑。

In the end, North Korea’s conduct may change only when its leadership does. That is most likely to happen from within. Kim Jong-un’s internal campaign of terror — in which even the highest-ranking officials are not safe from execution or assassination — increasingly risks provoking his overthrow.

最终,或许只有朝鲜的领导层变了,朝鲜的行事方式才会变。而这极有可能由内因触发。金正恩在国内开展的恐怖运动——就连一些最高级别的官员也有可能被处死或暗杀——让他的统治面临着越来越大的被推翻的风险。

Regime change could also mean regime collapse and a free-for-all to control the nuclear weapons. Worry about that possibility led the Obama administration to war-game collapse scenarios in the White House Situation Room. The results underscored the imperative of the United States reaching detailed understandings — first with South Korea, then with China — about exactly what the three countries would do, where their forces would go and who and how they would secure the North’s nuclear arsenal. Pursuing those plans must also be a priority for the Trump administration.

政变还可能意味着政权垮台,围绕核武器的控制权展开一场混战。出于对这种可能性的担忧,奥巴马政府成员曾在白宫战情室内推演朝鲜崩溃的种种情形。推演结果显示,美国必须和韩国还有中国就一些具体问题达成谅解:三国将做些什么;它们的军队将开赴哪里;由谁、以何种办法确保朝鲜核武库的安全。特朗普政府也必须把这些计划的制定当成重中之重。

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