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特朗普的难题:网络攻击能阻止朝鲜核计划吗?

更新时间:2017-3-5 10:55:37 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

Trump Inherits a Secret Cyberwar Against North Korean Missiles
特朗普的难题:网络攻击能阻止朝鲜核计划吗?

WASHINGTON — Three years ago, President Barack Obama ordered Pentagon officials to step up their cyber and electronic strikes against North Korea’s missile program in hopes of sabotaging test launches in their opening seconds.

华盛顿——三年前,贝拉克·奥巴马总统命令五角大楼官员加紧针对朝鲜的导弹计划开展网络和电子攻击,希望能从测试发射之初展开破坏。

Soon a large number of the North’s military rockets began to explode, veer off course, disintegrate in midair and plunge into the sea. Advocates of such efforts say they believe that targeted attacks have given American antimissile defenses a new edge and delayed by several years the day when North Korea will be able to threaten American cities with nuclear weapons launched atop intercontinental ballistic missiles.

很快,朝鲜的大量军事火箭开始爆炸,偏离航向,在空中解体,坠入大海。支持这样做的人士称,他们认为有针对性的攻击让美国在反导防御方面占据了新优势,而且把朝鲜掌握可威胁美国城市的洲际弹道导弹(ICBM)载核武器的时间推迟了数年。

But other experts have grown increasingly skeptical of the new approach, arguing that manufacturing errors, disgruntled insiders and sheer incompetence can also send missiles awry. Over the past eight months, they note, the North has managed to successfully launch three medium-range rockets. And Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, now claims his country is in “the final stage in preparations” for the inaugural test of his intercontinental missiles — perhaps a bluff, perhaps not.

但其他一些专家对这种新办法越来越持怀疑态度,认为制造上的差错、心怀不满的内部人员以及纯粹的无能也会导致导弹发射失败。他们指出,过去八个月里,朝鲜已经成功发射了三枚中程火箭。而且朝鲜领导人金正恩(Kim Jong-un)现在声称,自己的国家处于开始测试洲际导弹的“最后准备阶段”——他或许是在虚张声势,或许不是。

An examination of the Pentagon’s disruption effort, based on interviews with officials of the Obama and Trump administrations as well as a review of extensive but obscure public records, found that the United States still does not have the ability to effectively counter the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Those threats are far more resilient than many experts thought, The New York Times’s reporting found, and pose such a danger that Mr. Obama, as he left office, warned President Trump that they would likely be the most urgent problem he would confront.

通过采访任职于奥巴马政府和特朗普政府的官员,以及查阅广泛但却模糊的公开记录,我们对五角大楼的破坏行动进行了评估,发现美国尚无能力有效阻止朝鲜的核武器和导弹计划。根据《纽约时报》的报道发现,这些威胁的适应力远超很多专家此前的估计,构成了极大的危险,以致于奥巴马在卸任时警告特朗普总统,它们可能是他要面对的最紧迫的问题。

Mr. Trump has signaled his preference to respond aggressively against the North Korean threat. In a Twitter post after Mr. Kim first issued his warning on New Year’s Day, the president wrote, “It won’t happen!” Yet like Mr. Obama before him, Mr. Trump is quickly discovering that he must choose from highly imperfect options.

特朗普已经给出倾向于对朝鲜的威胁做出积极回应的信号。在金正恩于新年第一天发出警告之后,特朗普总统发推文称,“痴心妄想!”不过,像之前的奥巴马一样,特朗普很快就会发现,他必须从若干极度不完美的选项中做出选择。

He could order the escalation of the Pentagon’s cyber and electronic war effort, but that carries no guarantees. He could open negotiations with the North to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, but that would leave a looming threat in place. He could prepare for direct missile strikes on the launch sites, which Mr. Obama also considered, but there is little chance of hitting every target.

他可以下令让五角大楼加紧开展网络和电子攻击战备,但成效得不到保障。他可以启动和朝鲜的谈判,以便冻结其核武器和导弹计划,但这样做会让威胁阴魂不散。他可以准备直接对发射基地进行导弹袭击,奥巴马也考虑过这样做,但几乎没有可能击中所有目标。

In two meetings of Mr. Trump’s national security deputies in the Situation Room, the most recent on Tuesday, all those options were discussed, along with the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea as a dramatic warning. Trump administration officials say those issues will soon go to Mr. Trump and his top national security aides.

特朗普的国家安全事务副手在战情室开了两次会,最近一次是在周二。与会者讨论了所有这些选项,包括重新在韩国部署核武器,借此发出严重警告的可能性。特朗普政府的官员说,这些议题很快就会被提交给特朗普及其高级国家安全助手。

The decision to intensify the cyber and electronic strikes, in early 2014, came after Mr. Obama concluded that the $300 billion spent since the Eisenhower era on traditional antimissile systems, often compared to hitting “a bullet with a bullet,” had failed the core purpose of protecting the continental United States. Flight tests of interceptors based in Alaska and California had an overall failure rate of 56 percent, under near-perfect conditions. Privately, many experts warned the system would fare worse in real combat.

奥巴马之所以在2014年初下令加紧开展网络和电子攻击,是因为他得出了这样一个结论:自从艾森豪威尔时代以来,美国花在常常被人形容为“以弹击弹”的传统反导防御体系上的钱多达3000亿美元,但却没能实现保护美国本土的核心目标。在阿拉斯加州和加利福尼亚州开展的接近完美条件下的拦截弹飞行测试,总体失败率为56%。很多专家私下里警告说,该系统在实战中的表现会更糟糕。

So the Obama administration searched for a better way to destroy missiles. It reached for techniques the Pentagon had long been experimenting with under the rubric of “left of launch,” because the attacks begin before the missiles ever reach the launchpad, or just as they lift off. For years, the Pentagon’s most senior officers and officials have publicly advocated these kinds of sophisticated attacks in little-noticed testimony to Congress and at defense conferences.

因此奥巴马政府曾为摧毁这些核武器寻找更好的方法。他们将目光投向五角大楼长期以来一直在测试的技术。相关测试以“主动抑制发射”(left-of-launch)攻击为名,因为在导弹抵达发射台前或刚刚发射时,攻击就开始了。多年来,五角大楼最高级别的军官和官员,在基本没被注意到的国会证词以及国防会议中,一直公开提倡开展这类尖端的攻击。

The Times inquiry began last spring as the number of the North’s missile failures soared. The investigation uncovered the military documents praising the new antimissile approach and found some pointing with photos and diagrams to North Korea as one of the most urgent targets.

时报的调查开始于去年春天,当时朝鲜的导弹发射失败次数急剧上升。调查发现,军方文件称赞这是最新的反导技术,并通过照片和图表表明朝鲜是最紧迫的目标之一。

After discussions with the office of the director of national intelligence last year and in recent days with Mr. Trump’s national security team, The Times agreed to withhold details of those efforts to keep North Korea from learning how to defeat them. Last fall, Mr. Kim was widely reported to have ordered an investigation into whether the United States was sabotaging North Korea’s launches, and over the past week he has executed senior security officials.

在去年和近日分别与国家情报总监办公室和特朗普的国家安全团队进行讨论之后,时报同意不公布相关细节,以免让朝鲜了解如何抵御它们。媒体广泛报道称,金正恩去年秋天已经下令就美国是否在破坏朝鲜的发射展开调查;过去一周里,他处决了一些高级安全官员。

The approach taken in targeting the North Korean missiles has distinct echoes of the American- and Israeli-led sabotage of Iran’s nuclear program, the most sophisticated known use of a cyberweapon meant to cripple a nuclear threat. But even that use of the “Stuxnet” worm in Iran quickly ran into limits. It was effective for several years, until the Iranians figured it out and recovered. And Iran posed a relatively easy target: an underground nuclear enrichment plant that could be attacked repeatedly.

用来对付朝鲜导弹的这种办法,让人很容易联想起美国和以色列针对伊朗核计划发起的破坏行动——那是目前已知的、对旨在削弱核威胁的网络武器进行的最尖端应用。但就连对伊朗使用的Stuxnet蠕虫病毒,也很快就遇到了瓶颈。它在若干年里起了作用,直到伊朗人弄清了问题所在并清除了病毒。此外,伊朗当时提供了一个相对容易得手的目标:可以被反复攻击的地下核浓缩工厂。

In North Korea, the target is much more challenging. Missiles are fired from multiple launch sites around the country and moved about on mobile launchers in an elaborate shell game meant to deceive adversaries. To strike them, timing is critical.

在朝鲜的目标则更具挑战性。导弹是在全国各地的多个发射基地发射的,并由移动式发射器携带着四处游走,由此制造旨在欺骗对手的精巧骗局。要攻击它们,时机至关重要。

Advocates of the sophisticated effort to remotely manipulate data inside North Korea’s missile systems argue the United States has no real alternative because the effort to stop North Korea from learning the secrets of making nuclear weapons has already failed. The only hope now is stopping the country from developing an intercontinental missile, and demonstrating that destructive threat to the world.

提倡采取这种复杂的办法对朝鲜导弹系统内部的数据进行远程操控的人士认为,美国手中没有切实可行的替代选项,因为防止朝鲜掌握核武器制造诀窍的努力已经宣告失败。现在的唯一希望是阻止朝鲜研发出洲际弹道导弹,并向世人证明这种威胁的毁灭性。

“Disrupting their tests,” William J. Perry, secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, said at a recent presentation in Washington, would be “a pretty effective way of stopping their ICBM program.”

克林顿政府的国防部长威廉·J·佩里(William J. Perry)最近在华盛顿做报告时说,“干扰他们的测试”将是“阻止他们开展ICBM计划的一个相当有效的办法。”

Decades in the Making

数十年的制作

Three generations of the Kim family have dreamed that their broken, otherwise failed nation could build its own nuclear weapons, and the missiles to deliver them, as the ultimate survival strategy. With nukes in hand, the Kims have calculated, they need not fear being overrun by South Korea, invaded by the United States.

金家三代人一直都期盼,他们这个在其他方面都乏善可陈的国家,能够造出自己的核武器,以及运载核武器的导弹;并将其视为终极生存战略。金家人的盘算是,手握核武器,他们就不必担心朝鲜被韩国颠覆,被美国侵略。

North Korea began seeking an intercontinental ballistic missile decades ago: It was the dream of Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder, who bitterly remembered the American threats to use nuclear weapons against the North during the Korean War.

朝鲜数十年前便开始寻求掌握一枚洲际弹道导弹:该国创始人金日成(Kim Il-sung)对此梦寐以求——美国人在朝鲜战争期间威胁对朝使用核武器,给他留下了苦涩的回忆。

His break came after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when out-of-work Russian rocket scientists began seeking employment in North Korea. Soon, a new generation of North Korean missiles began to appear, all knockoffs of Soviet designs. Though flight tests were sparse, American experts marveled at how the North seemed to avoid the kinds of failures that typically strike new rocket programs, including those of the United States in the late 1950s.

他在苏联解体后取得了突破性进展,当时,失业的苏联火箭专家纷纷开始在朝鲜找工作。很快,朝鲜的新一代导弹便浮出水面,清一色模仿苏联的设计。尽管很少进行飞行测试,但朝鲜似乎想办法避开了新火箭计划通常会遭遇的那种失败——包括美国在1950年代末的那些,这让美国专家颇为惊讶。

The success was so marked that Timothy McCarthy of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey wrote in a 2001 analysis that Pyongyang’s record “appears completely unique in the history of missile development and production.”

它的成功非常显著,以致于蒙特雷国际研究学院(Middlebury Institute of International Studies)的蒂莫西·麦卡锡(Keith McCarthy)在2001年的一篇分析文章中写道,平壤的成绩“在导弹研发和生产史上似乎是独一无二的”。

In response, President George W. Bush announced in late 2002 the deployment of antimissile interceptors in Alaska and California. At the same time, Mr. Bush accelerated programs to get inside the long supply chain of parts for North Korean missiles, lacing them with defects and weaknesses, a technique also used for years against Iran.

作为回应,乔治·W·布什(George W. Bush)总统于2002年底宣布,在阿拉斯加州和加利福尼亚州部署反导拦截系统。与此同时,布什加紧实施打入漫长的朝鲜导弹部件供应链的计划,让那些部件出现缺陷和弱点——多年来美国也用这种办法对付过伊朗。

Threat Grows in Obama Era

威胁在奥巴马时代增长

By the time Mr. Obama took office in January 2009, the North had deployed hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles that used Russian designs, and had made billions of dollars selling its Scud missiles to Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. But it aspired to a new generation of missiles that could fire warheads over much longer distances.

到奥巴马于2009年1月上台的时候,朝鲜已经部署了数以百计承袭苏联设计的短程和中程导弹,并通过将自己的飞毛腿导弹销往埃及、利比亚、巴基斯坦、叙利亚、阿联酋和也门,赚了数十亿美元。但它渴望拥有能让核弹头抵达更远处的新一代导弹。

In secret cables written in the first year of the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the emerging threat.

在写于奥巴马上台第一年的机密电文中,国务卿希拉里·克林顿(Hillary Clinton)阐明了这种新威胁。

Among the most alarming released by WikiLeaks, the cables described a new path the North was taking to reach its long-range goal, based on a missile designed by the Soviets decades ago for their submarines that carried thermonuclear warheads.

由维基解密(WikiLeaks)公布的这些格外惊人的电文,描述了朝鲜正在采用的实现远程打击的新途径,该途径以苏联在几十年前为本国潜艇设计的一种搭载热核弹头的导弹为基础。

It was called the R-27. Unlike the North’s lumbering, older rockets and missiles, these would be small enough to hide in caves and move into position by truck. The advantage was clear: This missile would be far harder for the United States to find and destroy.

它被称为R-27。与朝鲜笨重的老式火箭和导弹不同,由R-27演变而来的导弹将足够小巧,可以被藏在洞穴里,并由卡车运送到位。其优势显而易见:美国将更加难以发现和摧毁这种导弹。

“North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world,” said an October 2009 cable marked “Secret” and signed by Mrs. Clinton.

“朝鲜的下一个目标或许是研发可对世界各地的目标构成威胁的机动ICBM,”2009年的一份注有“机密”字样的电文称,电文上有克林顿的签名。

The next year, one of the new missiles showed up in a North Korean military parade, just as the intelligence reports had warned.

第二年,正如情报报告所警告的,一枚新式导弹在朝鲜的阅兵式上现身。

By 2013, North Korean rockets thundered with new regularity. And that February, the North set off a nuclear test that woke up Washington: The monitoring data told of an explosion roughly the size of the bomb that leveled Hiroshima.

到2013年,朝鲜的火箭发射更加频密。当年2月,朝鲜开展的一次核试验惊醒了华盛顿:监控数据表明,那场爆炸的规模与夷平广岛的爆炸大体相当。

Days after the explosion, the Pentagon announced an expansion of its force of antimissile interceptors in California and Alaska. It also began to unveil its “left of launch” program to disable missiles before liftoff — hoping to bolster its chances of destroying them. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced the program, saying that “cyberwarfare, directed energy and electronic attack,” a reference to such things as malware, lasers and signal jamming, were all becoming important new adjuncts to the traditional ways of deflecting enemy strikes.

爆炸发生几天后,五角大楼宣布扩大反导弹拦截部队在加利福尼亚州和阿拉斯加州的部署。此外还开始公布“主动抑制发射”项目,在导弹发射前进行破坏,以期增加摧毁导弹的机会。参谋长联席会议(Joint Chiefs of Staff)主席马丁·E·邓普西上将(Gen. Martin E. Dempsey)宣布了该项目,称“网络战争、有针对性的能源和电子攻击”——他指的是恶意软件、激光和信号干扰等——新技术是对传统御敌手段的重要辅助。

He never mentioned North Korea. But a map accompanying General Dempsey’s policy paper on the subject showed one of the North’s missiles streaking toward the United States. Soon, in testimony before Congress and at public panels in Washington, current and former officials and a major contractor — Raytheon — began talking openly about “left of launch” technologies, in particular cyber and electronic strikes at the moment of launch.

他始终没提到朝鲜。但在邓普西关于此问题的政策文章中,随附的一张地图显示了从朝鲜飞向美国的一枚导弹。很快,在国会证词中以及华盛顿的公开讨论会上,现任和前任官员以及主要承包商雷神公司(Raytheon)开始公开谈论“主动抑制发射”技术,尤其是在发射同时进行的网络和电子攻击。

The North, meanwhile, was developing its own exotic arsenal. It tried repeatedly to disrupt American and South Korean military exercises by jamming electronic signals for guided weapons, including missiles. And it demonstrated its cyberpower in the oddest of places — Hollywood. In 2014, it attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment with a strike that destroyed about 70 percent of the company’s computing systems, surprising experts with its technical savvy.

与此同时,朝鲜在开发自己的新式武器。它多次试图通过干扰包括导弹在内的制导武器的电子信号来破坏美国和韩国的军事演习。它在最奇怪的地方——好莱坞——展示了自己的网络力量。2014年,它攻击了索尼电影娱乐公司(Sony Pictures Entertainment),破坏了该公司约70%的电脑系统,这种技术能力让专家们吃了一惊。

Last month, a report on cyber vulnerabilities by the Defense Science Board, commissioned by the Pentagon during the Obama administration, warned that North Korea might acquire the ability to cripple the American power grid, and cautioned that it could never be allowed to “hold vital U.S. strike systems at risk.”

上个月,一份由五角大楼在奥巴马政府执政期间委托的国防科学委员会(the Defense Science Board)发布的关于网络脆弱性的报告警告说,朝鲜可能会获得削弱美国电网的能力,并告诫道,永远不能允许“将美国重要的打击系统置于危险之中”。

A Secret Push, and New Doubts

暗中的推进和新的疑点

Not long after General Dempsey made his public announcement, Mr. Obama and his defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter, began calling meetings focused on one question: Could a crash program slow the North’s march toward an intercontinental ballistic missile?

在邓普西公开宣布之后不久,奥巴马和时任国防部长阿什顿·B·卡特(Ashton B.Carter)开始就一个问题召开会议:一个破坏项目能否延缓朝鲜向洲际弹道导弹迈进的步伐?

There were many options, some drawn from General Dempsey’s list. Mr. Obama ultimately pressed the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to pull out all the stops, which officials took as encouragement to reach for untested technologies.

选项有很多,其中一些来自邓普西列出的清单。奥巴马最终敦促五角大楼和情报机构全面行动起来,官员们认为这是在鼓励他们尝试未经证实的技术。

The North’s missiles soon began to fail at a remarkable pace. Some were destroyed, no doubt, by accident as well as by design. The technology the North was pursuing, using new designs and new engines, involved multistage rockets, introducing all kinds of possibilities for catastrophic mistakes. But by most accounts, the United States program accentuated the failures.

朝鲜的导弹很快开始以惊人的速度失败。毫无疑问,有些是因为意外和设计问题。朝鲜追求的技术——采用新设计和新发动机——涉及多级火箭,可能产生各种灾难性错误。但多数人认为,美国的项目加剧了这些失败。

The evidence was in the numbers. Most flight tests of an intermediate-range missile called the Musudan, the weapon that the North Koreans showed off in public just after Mrs. Clinton’s warning, ended in flames: Its overall failure rate is 88 percent.

统计数据可以证明这一点。希拉里警告后朝鲜马上用“舞水端”(Musudan)中程导弹的飞行试验来展示力量,但大多以失败告终:总体失败率为88%。

Nonetheless Kim Jong-un has pressed ahead on his main goal: an intercontinental ballistic missile. Last April, he was photographed standing next to a giant test-stand, celebrating after engineers successfully fired off a matched pair of the potent Russian-designed R-27 engines. The implication was clear: Strapping two of the engines together at the base of a missile was the secret to building an ICBM that could ultimately hurl warheads at the United States.

不过,金正恩推进了他的主要目标:洲际弹道导弹。去年4月,在工程师成功测试了一对俄罗斯设计的强大的R-27发动机后,金正恩被拍到站在一个巨大的试验台旁庆祝。用意很明显:将两个发动机捆绑在导弹尾部,是制造一枚最终能把弹头射到美国的洲际弹道导弹的秘诀。

In September, he celebrated the most successful test yet of a North Korean nuclear weapon — one that exploded with more than twice the destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb.

去年9月,他庆祝了朝鲜核武器有史以来最成功的一次测试——爆炸破坏力是广岛原子弹的两倍多。

His next goal, experts say, is to combine those two technologies, shrinking his nuclear warheads to a size that can fit on an intercontinental missile. Only then can he credibly claim that his isolated country has the know-how to hit an American city thousands of miles away.

专家表示,他的下一个目标是结合这两种技术,缩小核弹头使它的尺寸适合安装在一个洲际导弹上。只有这样他才能可信地宣告,这个被孤立的国家具有袭击数千英里之外的美国城市的技术。

In the last year of his presidency, Mr. Obama often noted publicly that the North was learning from every nuclear and missile test — even the failures — and getting closer to its goal. In private, aides noticed he was increasingly disturbed by North Korea’s progress.

在担任总统的最后一年,奥巴马经常公开指出,朝鲜正在从每一次核试验和导弹试验中学习,包括那些失败的试验,它正越来越接近自己的目标。私下里,助手们注意到他对朝鲜的进展感到越来越不安。

With only a few months left in office, he pushed aides for new approaches. At one meeting, he declared that he would have targeted the North Korean leadership and weapons sites if he thought it would work. But it was, as Mr. Obama and his assembled aides knew, an empty threat: Getting timely intelligence on the location of North Korea’s leaders or their weapons at any moment would be almost impossible, and the risks of missing were tremendous, including renewed war on the Korean Peninsula.

还剩几个月就要离任时,他敦促助手们寻找新方法。在一次会议上,他宣布,如果他认为有用,他会以朝鲜领导人和武器所在地为目标。但是,正如奥巴马和他的全体助手们所知,这是一个空洞的威胁:随时掌握朝鲜领导人或其武器的位置几乎是不可能的,而漏掉情报的风险则是巨大的,包括朝鲜半岛重新开战。

For Trump, Hard Decisions

特朗普面临的艰难抉择

As a presidential candidate, Mr. Trump complained that “we're so obsolete in cyber,” a line that grated on officials at the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, where billions of dollars have been spent to provide the president with new options for intelligence gathering and cyberattacks. Now, one of the immediate questions he faces is whether to accelerate or scale back those efforts.

特朗普在竞选时抱怨称,“我们在网络方面太过时”,这句话惹怒了美国网络战司令部(United States Cyber Command)和国家安全局(National Security Agency)的官员,这两个机构已花费数十亿美元为总统提供新的情报搜集和网络攻击方式。现在,他面临的一个紧急问题是,是该加速还是缩减这些努力。

A decision to go after an adversary’s launch ability can have unintended consequences, experts warn.

专家警告说,决定对敌人的发射能力展开攻击可能会产生意想不到的后果。

Once the United States uses cyberweapons against nuclear launch systems — even in a threatening state like North Korea — Russia and China may feel free to do the same, targeting fields of American missiles. Some strategists argue that all nuclear systems should be off-limits for cyberattack. Otherwise, if a nuclear power thought it could secretly disable an adversary’s atomic controls, it might be more tempted to take the risk of launching a pre-emptive attack.

一旦美国使用网络武器来反击核发射系统——即使是应对像朝鲜这样有威胁性的状态——俄罗斯和中国可能就会自由地做出同样的行为,来瞄准美国的导弹领域。一些战略家认为,所有核武器系统都应该是网络攻击的禁区。否则,如果一个核武器认为它可以秘密地禁用对手的原子控制,它将会受到更大的诱惑去冒险发动先发制人的攻击。

“I understand the urgent threat,” said Amy Zegart, a Stanford University intelligence and cybersecurity expert, who said she had no independent knowledge of the American effort. “But 30 years from now we may decide it was a very, very dangerous thing to do.”

“我了解威胁的紧急性,”斯坦福大学(Stanford University)的情报和网络安全专家艾米·泽加特(Amy Zegart)说。她说自己对美国的行动没有第一手的了解。“但是30年后,我们可能会发现,这是一个非常危险的决定。”

Mr. Trump’s aides say everything is on the table. China recently cut off coal imports from the North, but the United States is also looking at ways to freeze the Kim family’s assets, some of which are believed held in Chinese-controlled banks. The Chinese have already opposed the deployment of a high-altitude missile defense system known as Thaad in South Korea; the Trump team may call for even more such systems.

特朗普的助手表示,一切都很明确。中国最近切断了朝鲜的煤炭进口,但美国也在考虑冻结金氏家族资产的方法,其中一些资产被认为保存在中国控制的银行里。中国已经表示反对在韩国部署被称为萨德(Thaad)的高空导弹防御系统,而特朗普团队可能要求部署更多这样的系统。

The White House is also looking at pre-emptive military strike options, a senior Trump administration official said, though the challenge is huge given the country’s mountainous terrain and deeply buried tunnels and bunkers. Placing American tactical nuclear weapons back into South Korea — they were withdrawn a quarter-century ago — is also under consideration, even if that step could accelerate an arms race with the North.

特朗普政府的一名高官表示,白宫也在考虑先发制人的军事打击方式,虽然它面临巨大挑战,因为该国多山,而且有很多深藏的地道和地堡。白宫也在考虑再次在韩国部署美国的战术核武器——它们在25年前被撤回——即使这一举动可能加速与朝鲜的军备竞赛。

Mr. Trump’s “It won’t happen!” post on Twitter about the North’s ICBM threat suggests a larger confrontation could be looming.

特朗普在Twitter上提到朝鲜ICBM威胁时的那句“痴心妄想!”表明,未来可能会有更激烈的对峙。

“Regardless of Trump’s actual intentions,” James M. Acton, a nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently noted, “the tweet could come to be seen as a ‘red line’ and hence set up a potential test of his credibility.”

“不管特朗普的真实意图是什么,”卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)的核分析师詹姆斯·M·阿克顿(James M. Acton)最近指出,“这条推可以被视为一条‘红线’,所以这可能也是对他的可信度的一种考验。”

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