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美国必须与朝鲜对话

更新时间:2017-1-16 10:48:16 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea
美国必须与朝鲜对话

STANFORD, Calif. — Since my first visit to North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex in 2004, I have witnessed the country’s nuclear weapons program grow from a handful of primitive bombs to a formidable nuclear arsenal that represents one of America’s greatest security threats. After decades of broken policies toward Pyongyang, talking to the North Koreans is the best option for the Trump administration at this late date to limit the growing threat.

加州斯坦福——自2004年第一次参观位于朝鲜宁边的核设施以来,我见证了这个国家的核武器项目从为数不多的简陋核弹,发展成强大的核武库,成为美国面临的最大安全威胁之一。美国对平壤实行了几十年的蹩脚政策,事到如今,与朝鲜对话是特朗普政府对这一日益增长的威胁进行限制的最佳选择。

North Korea broke out to build the bomb because President George W. Bush was determined to kill President Bill Clinton’s 1994 “Agreed Framework,” a bilateral agreement with the North to freeze and eventually dismantle the North’s nuclear program. Hard-liners in the Bush administration viewed it as appeasement. Mr. Bush labeled the North, along with Iran and Iraq, part of an “axis of evil” in January 2002.

朝鲜开始制造核弹是因为乔治·W·布什(George W. Bush)总统决心废除比尔·克林顿总统1994年达成的《框架协议》(Agreed Framework)。依据该双边协议,朝鲜会冻结并最终废除其核武器项目。布什政府中的强硬派认为这是绥靖主义。2002年1月,布什给朝鲜、伊朗和伊拉克打上了“邪恶轴心”的标签。

At the first bilateral meeting with Kim Jong-il’s regime in Pyongyang in October 2002, Bush administration officials accused North Korea of violating the Clinton pact by clandestinely pursuing the uranium path to the bomb. Washington had already detected this effort in the late 1990s, but it was deemed an insufficient threat not worthy of jeopardizing the gains made by the plutonium freeze.

2002年10月,在与金正日(Kim Jong-il)政府进行首次双边会晤时,布什政府的官员指责朝鲜违反了克林顿的协议,称朝鲜在暗中尝试用铀制造核弹。华盛顿在90年代末就侦测到了这种努力,但认为它构不成威胁,不值得为之破坏在钚冻结方面取得的进步。

For the Bush administration, the clandestine uranium effort was all it needed to walk away from the Agreed Framework. Yet Mr. Bush’s team proved unprepared for the consequences and stood by as North Korea resumed its plutonium program and built the bomb.

在布什政府看来,单凭朝鲜秘密推进铀弹计划,就足以令美国废除《框架协议》。不过后来的事实证明,布什的团队并没有预料到这样做的后果,在朝鲜重启钚项目、制造核弹的时候袖手旁观。

During six visits between 2004 and 2009, I watched the North continue to try to engage Washington, while the Bush administration preferred the six-party talks led by China, believing that the North would have greater difficulty cheating in the context of multilateral diplomacy. In a 2004 visit, I was even allowed to hold a piece of plutonium — in a sealed glass jar — to convince me and Washington that North Korea had the bomb.

从2004年至2009年的六年间,我看到朝鲜一直试图与华盛顿接触,但布什政府更倾向于由中国领导的六方会谈,认为朝鲜在多方外交中会更加难以作弊。在2004年的一次访问中,我甚至被允许拿起一块钚——放在一个封闭的玻璃瓶里——目的是让我和华盛顿相信朝鲜的确有核弹。

In September 2005, China orchestrated a six-party joint statement calling for a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula. When the Bush administration concurrently slapped financial sanctions on Pyongyang, the North Koreans walked out of the six-party talks and responded with their first nuclear test in October 2006.

2005年9月,中国组织签署了六方联合声明,呼吁实现朝鲜半岛无核化。当布什政府同时对平壤进行金融制裁时,朝鲜退出了六方会谈,以2006年10月的第一次核试验做出回应。

I was in Pyongyang three weeks later and found that although the test was only partly successful, it marked a turning point in the North’s nuclear program. North Korea became a nuclear weapon state and insisted that all future negotiations proceed from that reality. Mr. Bush left office with the North most likely possessing up to five plutonium-fueled nuclear weapons and an expanding uranium program.

三周后,我抵达平壤,发现尽管这次试验只取得了部分成功,但它却是朝鲜核项目发展的一个转折点。朝鲜成为了一个核武国家,并坚持未来所有的谈判都从这一现实出发。布什卸任时,朝鲜很有可能已经拥有五枚以钚为燃料的核武器和一个正在扩张的铀弹项目。

North Korea greeted the Obama administration with a long-range rocket launch, followed by a second nuclear test in May 2009 — this one, successful. Unlike the Bush administration, which faced the prospect of the North’s violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Obama administration faced the North’s steady march to an expanding arsenal.

朝鲜以一枚远程火箭发射迎接奥巴马政府上台,紧接着又在2009年5月进行了第二次核试验——这一次成功了。与布什政府面临的朝鲜违反《核不扩散条约》(Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty)的前景不同,奥巴马政府面对的是朝鲜朝着核武库扩张的方向稳步迈进的现实。

Mr. Obama was also unwilling to engage directly with Pyongyang, insisting instead that the North denuclearize before starting talks. It appears the Obama administration also viewed the regimes of Kim Jong-il and his son and successor, Kim Jong-un, as repugnant and hoped for their collapse, while also staying in step with two conservative South Korean administrations. Mr. Obama’s preferred path has been to tighten United Nations and United States sanctions and to pressure Beijing to reign in Pyongyang. Neither strategy has stopped the Kim regime from expanding its nuclear program.

奥巴马也不愿直接与平壤接触,坚持要在朝鲜无核化之后再进行谈判。看起来,奥巴马政府也认为金正日和他的儿子、继任者金正恩(Kim Jong-un)不得人心,希望他们倒台,同时与两届保守的韩国政府步调一致。奥巴马更愿意选择的路径一直是加强联合国与美国的制裁,向北京施压,让后者制约平壤。这两项策略都没能阻止金氏政权继续扩大其核武器项目。

Pyongyang upped the ante on its nuclear program with a remarkable revelation during my seventh and last visit in November 2010: the existence of a modern uranium centrifuge facility in Yongbyon. That facility served notice that the North was now capable of pursuing the second path to the bomb. No outsiders are known to have been in Yongbyon since my 2010 visit.

在我于2010年11月第七次,也是最后一次访问朝鲜时,平壤加大了自己在核武器项目上的赌注:宁边出现了一座现代化的铀离心机设施。这座设施等于是宣告,朝鲜现在有能力发展制造核弹的第二条道路了。据悉,自我2010年访问之后,外界没有人再去过宁边。

Satellite imagery of the Yongbyon complex combined with official North Korean propaganda photos and three additional successful nuclear tests point to a robust and rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal. My best estimate, admittedly highly uncertain, is that North Korea has sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium to build 20 to 25 nuclear weapons.

宁边核设施的卫星图片、朝鲜官方发布的宣传照片,以及另外三次成功的核试验,都指向一座健全的、快速扩大的核武库。我最好的估量是——诚然有很大的不确定性——朝鲜已经有足够的钚和高浓缩铀,足以制造20至25枚核武器。

The North also launched some two dozen missiles in 2016, including partly successful road-mobile and submarine-based missiles that could potentially carry nuclear warheads.

朝鲜还在2016年发射了大约24枚导弹,包括部分成功的陆地机动发射导弹和潜艇导弹,它们都有可能搭载核弹头。

President-elect Donald J. Trump faces a much graver threat from the North than his two predecessors. Pyongyang can most likely already reach all of South Korea, Japan and possibly even some United States targets in the Pacific.

相比于他的两位前任,候任总统唐纳德·J·特朗普所面临的来自朝鲜的威胁要严重得多。平壤很有可能已经能将武器发射至韩国、日本全境,甚至包括美国在太平洋沿岸的一些目标。

The crisis is here. The nuclear clock keeps ticking. Every six to seven weeks North Korea may be able to add another nuclear weapon to its arsenal. All in the hands of Kim Jong-un, a young leader about whom we know little, and a military about which we know less. Both are potentially prone to overconfidence and miscalculations.

危机已经来临。核弹引爆的时钟在不停计时。每隔六到七周,朝鲜的核武库里可能就会增加一枚核武器。这一切都掌握在外界知之甚少的年轻领导人金正恩和一支我们了解更少的军队手中。两者都有可能过于自信、做出错误的估计。

These sensitive nuclear issues require focused discussions in a small, closed setting. This cannot be achieved at a multilateral negotiating table, such as the six-party talks.

这些敏感的核问题需要在小规模的封闭环境下进行集中的讨论。这无法在多边参与的谈判桌上实现,比如六方会谈。

Mr. Trump should send a presidential envoy to North Korea. Talking is not a reward or a concession to Pyongyang and should not be construed as signaling acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Talking is a necessary step to re-establishing critical links of communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

特朗普应该派一名特使前往朝鲜。对话不是一种对平壤的奖励或妥协,也不该被理解为释放的信号,表示美国接受朝鲜持有核武器。对于重新建立关键的沟通连结、避免核灾难而言,对话是必要的一步。

Mr. Trump has little to lose by talking. He can risk the domestic political downside of appearing to appease the North. He would most likely get China’s support, which is crucial because Beijing prefers talking to more sanctions. He would also probably get support for bilateral talks from Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow.

对特朗普而言,举行会谈也几乎谈不上什么损失。他有可能因为看起来好像姑息朝鲜而在国内政治中受到负面影响。但他很有可能获得中国的支持——这是至关重要的——因为相比于制裁,北京更喜欢对话。首尔、东京和莫斯科可能也会支持他举行双边会谈。

By talking, and especially by listening, the Trump administration may learn more about the North’s security concerns. It would allow Washington to signal the strength of its resolve to protect its allies and express its concerns about human rights abuses, as well as to demonstrate its openness to pragmatic, balanced progress.

通过对话,尤其是通过倾听,特朗普政府或许能更加了解朝鲜的安全顾虑。这会让华盛顿展示出它保护自己盟友的决心有多大,可以表达它对侵犯人权行为的关切,也能表明它对务实、均衡的进步持开放心态。

Talking will help inform a better negotiating strategy that may eventually convince the young leader that his country and his regime are better off without nuclear weapons.

对话有助于形成一个更好的谈判策略,这种策略最终或许能说服那位年轻的领导人相信,没有核武器对他的国家和政权来说是更好的选择。

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