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尼克松的大阴谋

更新时间:2017-1-6 11:55:07 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

Nixon’s Vietnam Treachery
尼克松的大阴谋

Richard M. Nixon always denied it: to David Frost, to historians and to Lyndon B. Johnson, who had the strongest suspicions and the most cause for outrage at his successor’s rumored treachery. To them all, Nixon insisted that he had not sabotaged Johnson’s 1968 peace initiative to bring the war in Vietnam to an early conclusion. “My God. I would never do anything to encourage” South Vietnam “not to come to the table,” Nixon told Johnson, in a conversation captured on the White House taping system.

理查德·M·尼克松(Richard M. Nixon)一直否认此事,无论是对大卫·弗罗斯特(David Frost),对历史学者,还是对林登·B·约翰逊(Lyndon B. Johnson)——后者抱有最强烈的疑虑,也最有理由因为其继任者传闻中的背叛而怒火中烧。面对这些人,尼克松一直坚称,他没有破坏约翰逊为尽快结束越南战争而提出的和平倡议。“天啊。我绝不会做任何事去怂恿”南越“别坐到谈判桌前”,尼克松在一次被白宫录音系统录下的谈话中告诉约翰逊。

Now we know Nixon lied. A newfound cache of notes left by H. R. Haldeman, his closest aide, shows that Nixon directed his campaign’s efforts to scuttle the peace talks, which he feared could give his opponent, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, an edge in the 1968 election. On Oct. 22, 1968, he ordered Haldeman to “monkey wrench” the initiative.

现在我们知道尼克松撒了谎。新发现的其心腹助手H·R·霍尔德曼(H. R. Haldeman)留下的笔记显示,尼克松指示自己的竞选团队对和平谈判进行了破坏,因为他担心相关谈判会让他的竞争对手、副总统休伯特·H·汉弗莱(Hubert H. Humphrey)在1968年的大选中占据优势。1968年10月22日,他命令霍尔德曼给和平倡议“捣乱”。

The 37th president has been enjoying a bit of a revival recently, as his achievements in foreign policy and the landmark domestic legislation he signed into law draw favorable comparisons to the presidents (and president-elect) that followed. A new, $15 million face-lift at the Nixon presidential library, while not burying the Watergate scandals, spotlights his considerable record of accomplishments.

最近,随着在外交政策方面的成就和经他签署成为国内法律的划时代立法,他被拿来同后世的总统(以及候任总统)比较,并得出了对他有利的结论,曾担任美国第37任总统的尼克松的形象得到了一些恢复。耗资1500万美元(约合1亿元人民币)翻修尼克松总统图书馆一事,尽管无法掩盖水门丑闻,也还是突出了他的重大成就。

Haldeman’s notes return us to the dark side. Amid the reappraisals, we must now weigh apparently criminal behavior that, given the human lives at stake and the decade of carnage that followed in Southeast Asia, may be more reprehensible than anything Nixon did in Watergate.

霍尔德曼的笔记让我们回到了阴暗的一面。在重新评价尼克松时,我们现在必须掂量那些似乎属于犯罪的行为。考虑到其中牵涉的人命,以及在那之后东南亚出现的长达十年的屠杀,这些也许比尼克松在水门做的任何事情都更应该受到指责。

Nixon had entered the fall campaign with a lead over Humphrey, but the gap was closing that October. Henry A. Kissinger, then an outside Republican adviser, had called, alerting Nixon that a deal was in the works: If Johnson would halt all bombing of North Vietnam, the Soviets pledged to have Hanoi engage in constructive talks to end a war that had already claimed 30,000 American lives.

秋季的竞选活动开始时,尼克松领先于汉弗莱,但到了10月,两人之间的差距缩小。时任共和党外部顾问的亨利·A·基辛格(Henry A. Kissinger)打电话给尼克松,提醒他一项协议正在酝酿过程中:苏联承诺,如果约翰逊停止对北越的一切轰炸,便让河内参与有建设性的谈判,以便结束战争。当时,那场战争已经夺去了三万美国人的生命。

But Nixon had a pipeline to Saigon, where the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, feared that Johnson would sell him out. If Thieu would stall the talks, Nixon could portray Johnson’s actions as a cheap political trick. The conduit was Anna Chennault, a Republican doyenne and Nixon fund-raiser, with connections across Asia.

但尼克松和西贡方面有联络渠道。在那里,南越总统阮文绍(Nguyen Van Thieu)担心约翰逊会出卖自己。如果阮文绍拖延谈判,尼克松便可将约翰逊的行动说成是廉价的政治把戏。这个渠道就是陈香梅(Anna Chennault),一位共和党资深人物,尼克松的资金筹集人,在亚洲各地都有关系。

“! Keep Anna Chennault working on” South Vietnam, Haldeman scrawled, recording Nixon’s orders. “Any other way to monkey wrench it? Anything RN can do.”

“!让陈香梅继续做”南越的工作,霍尔德曼潦草地记录了尼克松的命令。“还有什么办法可以给这件事的捣乱的?RN能办到的任何办法。”(RN指尼克松。——译注)

Nixon told Haldeman to have Rose Mary Woods, the candidate’s personal secretary, contact another nationalist Chinese figure — the businessman Louis Kung — and have him press Thieu as well. “Tell him hold firm,” Nixon said.

尼克松让霍尔德曼吩咐自己的私人秘书罗丝·玛丽·伍兹(Rose Mary Woods)联系另一名支持国民党的华人、商人孔令杰(Louis Kung),并让他也向阮文绍施压。“让他坚定立场,”尼克松说。

Nixon also sought help from Chiang Kai-shek, the president of Taiwan. And he ordered Haldeman to have his vice-presidential candidate, Spiro T. Agnew, threaten the C.I.A. director, Richard Helms. Helms’s hopes of keeping his job under Nixon depended on his pliancy, Agnew was to say. “Tell him we want the truth — or he hasn’t got the job,” Nixon said.

尼克松还向台湾总统蒋介石寻求帮助。此外,他命令霍尔德曼让副总统候选人斯皮罗·T·阿格纽(Spiro T. Agnew)威胁中情局(CIA)局长理查德·赫尔姆斯(Richard Helms)。阿格纽要向赫尔姆斯传达的意思是,他在尼克松上台后保住工作的希望取决于他的灵活性。“告诉他我们想知道真相,否则他就保不住工作,”尼克松说。

Throughout his life, Nixon feared disclosure of this skulduggery. “I did nothing to undercut them,” he told Frost in their 1977 interviews. “As far as Madame Chennault or any number of other people,” he added, “I did not authorize them and I had no knowledge of any contact with the South Vietnamese at that point, urging them not to.” Even after Watergate, he made it a point of character. “I couldn’t have done that in conscience.”

尼克松一生都害怕公开这个阴谋。“我没做过破坏他们的事情,”他在1977年接受弗罗斯特的采访时说。“至于陈夫人或其他很多人,”他补充说,“我没有授权他们,对当时与南越的任何接触都不知情,我让他们不要这么做。”即便是在水门事件爆发后,他依然特别注重名誉。“我的良知不允许我那么做。”

Nixon had cause to lie. His actions appear to violate federal law, which prohibits private citizens from trying to “defeat the measures of the United States.” His lawyers fought throughout Nixon’s life to keep the records of the 1968 campaign private. The broad outline of “the Chennault affair” would dribble out over the years. But the lack of evidence of Nixon’s direct involvement gave pause to historians and afforded his loyalists a defense.

尼克松有理由撒谎。他的行为似乎违反了禁止普通公民尝试“阻挠美国的行动”的联邦法律。尼克松在世期间,他的律师一直奋力让有关1968年那场竞选的记录保密。经过多年,“陈香梅事件”的大致情节才慢慢传出来。但缺乏尼克松直接参与的证据这一点让历史学者心生犹豫,并给支持他的人提供了一个辩解的理由。

Time has yielded Nixon’s secrets. Haldeman’s notes were opened quietly at the presidential library in 2007, where I came upon them in my research for a biography of the former president. They contain other gems, like Haldeman’s notations of a promise, made by Nixon to Southern Republicans, that he would retreat on civil rights and “lay off pro-Negro crap” if elected president. There are notes from Nixon’s 1962 California gubernatorial campaign, in which he and his aides discuss the need to wiretap political foes.

时间泄露了尼克松的秘密。2007年,尼克松总统图书馆低调地公开了霍尔德曼的笔记。我在那里为撰写这位前总统的传记做研究时,偶然发现了它们。它们还包含其他宝贵信息,如霍尔德曼多次记下的一个承诺,即尼克松答应南方的共和党人,如果当选总统,他会在民权问题上让步,并“让那些支持黑鬼的破事缓一缓”。还有尼克松1962年竞选加州州长期间的笔记。在那些笔记中,他和助手讨论了监听政敌的必要性。

Of course, there’s no guarantee that, absent Nixon, talks would have proceeded, let alone ended the war. But Johnson and his advisers, at least, believed in their mission and its prospects for success.

当然,没人保证,没有尼克松的话谈判就会继续进行,更别说结束那场战争了。但至少约翰逊和他的顾问相信他们的使命,也相信他们能取得成功。

When Johnson got word of Nixon’s meddling, he ordered the F.B.I. to track Chennault’s movements. She “contacted Vietnam Ambassador Bui Diem,” one report from the surveillance noted, “and advised him that she had received a message from her boss … to give personally to the ambassador. She said the message was … ‘Hold on. We are gonna win. … Please tell your boss to hold on.’ ”

得知尼克松从中干预的消息后,约翰逊下令联邦调查局(FBI)追踪陈香梅的动向。她“联系了越南大使裴艳(Bui Diem),”一份监视报告写道,“并告诉他说,她收到了老板的指示……要亲自告诉大使。她说这个指示是……‘坚持一下。我们会赢的。……请让你的老板坚持住。’”

In a conversation with the Republican senator Everett Dirksen, the minority leader, Johnson lashed out at Nixon. “I’m reading their hand, Everett,” Johnson told his old friend. “This is treason.”

在与共和党参议员、少数党领袖埃弗里特·德克森(Everett Dirksen)交谈时,约翰逊猛烈抨击尼克松。“我知道他们的意图,埃弗里特,”约翰逊对自己的老朋友说。“这是叛国。”

“I know,” Dirksen said mournfully.

“我懂,”德克森悲伤地说。

Johnson’s closest aides urged him to unmask Nixon’s actions. But on a Nov. 4 conference call, they concluded that they could not go public because, among other factors, they lacked the “absolute proof,” as Defense Secretary Clark Clifford put it, of Nixon’s direct involvement.

约翰逊身边的助手劝他揭露尼克松的行径。但在11月4日的电话会议上,他们决定不能对外公布。用国防部长克拉克·克利福德(Clark Clifford)话来说,其中一个原因是他们没有尼克松直接参与此事的“确凿证据”。

Nixon was elected president the next day.

第二天,尼克松当选总统。

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