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如果特朗普重启核军备竞赛,后果有多严重?

更新时间:2016-12-26 18:42:41 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

Trump, Promising Arms Race, Could Set World on Uncertain Path
如果特朗普重启核军备竞赛,后果有多严重?

If President-elect Donald J. Trump meant what he said, then the world may one day look back to recall that the first superpower nuclear arms race since the Cold War was announced by two pajama-clad talk show hosts.

如果候任总统唐纳德·J·特朗普(Donald J. Trump)说的是真心话,那么大家以后回顾往事的时候就会想起,自从冷战之后,超级大国的第一次核军备竞赛是由两个穿睡衣的脱口秀节目主持人宣布的。

“Let it be an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all,” Mika Brzezinski, of MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” program, said on Friday. She and her co-host, curled up in holiday-themed nightwear in front of a fake fireplace, said the quote was a statement from Mr. Trump, elaborating on a Twitter message on nuclear weapons.

“来搞一场军备竞赛吧。我们在每个回合上都会打败它们,而且会笑到最后。”微软全国广播公司(MSNBC)的《早安,乔》(Morning Joe)主持人米卡·布热津斯基(Mika Brzezinski)上周五说。当时她和另一个主持人穿着假日主题的睡衣,蜷缩在一个假壁炉前,说这句话是来自特朗普的声明,并详细说明了他关于核武器的一条推文。

Mr. Trump has a history of bluster and his declarations may turn out to be bluffs. But should he follow through on instigating a nuclear arms race, the consequences could be severe. Best estimates of likely Russian and Chinese responses offer a concerning guide. So do lessons from the Cold War arms race, which brought the world so close to the brink that once-hostile American and Soviet adversaries worked to reverse the competition they had once seen as essential.

从特朗普以往的恐吓来看,他的声明有可能会变成诈唬。但是,如果他坚持开展核军备竞赛,后果可能会很严重。俄罗斯、中国等国可能做出的回应,即便是在最好的情况下也让人感到担心。而且冷战时期的军备竞赛也是一个教训,它让世界几近崩溃,以至于一度敌对的美国和苏联也不得不扭转这场他们曾经认为至关重要的竞争。

Nuclear arms races are not usually something that states set out to provoke, but are pulled into against their wills.

国家层面通常不想挑起核武器竞赛,往往是被违心地拖进去的。

In the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union saw themselves as reacting to one another, straining to maintain a strategic balance that would deter war or at least make it survivable.

在冷战期间,美国和苏联认为自己是在回应对方的行动,它们紧张地保持着战略平衡,希望可以阻止战争,或者至少能在战争中得以存活。

Winston Churchill remarked in 1954 that more warheads could accomplish little more than to “make the rubble bounce.”

温斯顿·丘吉尔(Winston Churchill)1954年曾说,更多的弹头能做到的无非是“让碎石头弹起来”。

But this quote reflects a long-held misunderstanding: that the arms race was a simple matter of accruing warheads.

但这句话导致了一个长期的误解:军备竞赛就是累积弹头那么简单。

In fact, it was far more dangerous, with ever-growing stockpiles merely reflecting complex tit-for-tat advances. For instance, one country might develop weapons that could deliver warheads more rapidly, which would require the other to shorten its response time and build redundant, retaliatory weapons.

事实上,它的危险性要大得多,不断增加的核库存反映的只是复杂的、日益加剧的针锋相对。例如,一个国家可能开发出快速运载弹头的武器系统,这就需要另一个国家缩短反应时间,制造更多的武器来进行报复。

While “arms race” describes the sets of policies that helped make the Cold War so dangerous, arms racing was not in itself policy. Rather, it was a much-lamented — and much-feared — byproduct of American and Soviet aims. Leaders on both sides wanted to avoid losing, but none saw the race as desirable.

虽然“军备竞赛”描述的是一系列增加冷战危险性的政策,但军备竞赛本身并不是政策。相反,它是美国和苏联达成目标过程中一个令人悲哀和担心的副产品。双方领导人都想避免失败,对军备竞赛本身并不积极。

The exception, Ronald Reagan, entered office in 1981 determined to win the Cold War in part by outstripping the Soviet Union on nuclear arms. But after a few years of tightening response times and near-miss incidents, he became the most enthusiastic proponent of nuclear disarmament to occupy the Oval Office.

例外的一次是,罗纳德·里根(Ronald Reagan)在1981年就职的时候决心赢得冷战,方法之一就是在核武器上超越苏联。但是在之后几年里,留给双方的反应时间越来越短,还出现了几次惊险状况,结果他成为椭圆形办公室中最积极的核裁军倡议者。

Though some Americans believe the arms race won the Cold War, as Mr. Reagan had initially hoped, the two sides ended their competition willingly — and a few years before internal political and economic forces would pull down the Soviet Union from within.

虽然一些美国人认为军备竞赛赢得了冷战,就像里根最初希望的那样,但其实是双方自愿结束了较量——没过几年,苏联就被国内的政治和经济问题击垮了。

Mr. Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, sought total disarmament at a 1986 summit meeting. Unable to agree on terms, they settled for an ongoing drawdown of nuclear forces, reversing the arms race.

里根和苏联领导人米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)试图在1986年的峰会上谋求全面裁军。由于无法达成一致条件,他们决定逐步削减核力量,扭转两国之间的军备竞赛。

Such reductions have continued since, codified in treaties such as the 2010 New Start agreement, which Mr. Trump’s policy would likely undo.

此后这种裁军持续进行,双方签订了相关条约,比如2010年的《削减战略武器新条约》(New Start)等,从特朗普的政策来看,这个条约可能会撤消。

In his Twitter post on Thursday announcing that policy, Mr. Trump said his goal was that “the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.”

特朗普周四在Twitter上宣布了这个政策,说他的目标是“直到世界在核武器上变得明智为止”。

It is not clear what that means. But whatever his intention, analysts say that Mr. Trump’s stated desire to provoke an arms race does have a foreseeable range of outcomes.

目前还不清楚他是什么意思。但分析师们说,无论特朗普的意图如何,他这种要挑起军备竞赛的态度确实会带来一些可预见的后果。

The country most likely to respond is Russia, whose nuclear arsenal is comparable to that of the United States.

最有可能做出反应的国家是俄罗斯,俄罗斯的核武库与美国相当。

Since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has seen nuclear parity with the United States as its last — perhaps only — guarantee of survival against a far stronger Western alliance it perceives as an existential threat. Falling behind would, in Moscow’s view, invite Russia’s destruction.

自从冷战结束以来,莫斯科把同美国保持核平衡视为最后的――也许是唯一的――保证,令俄罗斯能与远比自己强大得多,且被它视为威胁自己生存的西方联盟抗衡。莫斯科认为,在这方面落后就意味着俄罗斯自取灭亡。

Though Russia’s economy is a fraction the size of America’s, it has kept up. Should it find parity too costly, Moscow would likely compensate by expending another kind of currency: its willingness to accept nuclear risk.

虽然俄罗斯的经济只相当于美国的一小部分,但它一直紧跟美国。如果发现保持核平衡代价太大,莫斯科很可能通过使用另一种通货来进行补偿:接受核风险的意愿。

This would be aimed at strengthening Russian deterrence against any American threat. For instance, Russia might deploy more nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave located between Poland and Lithuania. Such missiles can reach European capitals in a matter of minutes and, because they are fired from special vehicles, can be difficult to knock out.

这意味着加强俄罗斯对美国任何威胁的威慑。例如,俄罗斯可能在加里宁格勒部署更多具备核能力的伊斯坎德尔导弹(加里宁格勒是位于波兰和立陶宛之间的俄罗斯飞地)。这种导弹可以在几分钟内到达欧洲各国的首都,由于它们是从特种车辆上发射的,可能很难被消灭。

Vladimir V. Putin, the Russian president, could also loosen restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons. Some analysts already believe that Russian military doctrine allows for the use of a single “de-escalatory” nuclear strike, in case of a conventional war, to force the other side to stand down. Such policies put a greater onus on the United States to reduce risk, compensating for any relative Russian weakness.

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·V·普京(Vladimir V. Putin)也可以放松对使用核武器的限制。一些分析师已经确信,俄罗斯军事原则允许在常规战争中使用一次“降温”核打击,迫使对方停止行动。这种策略令美国需要背上更大的负担,以降低风险,从而弥补了俄罗斯的任何相对弱点。

Paul C. Warnke, a senior Pentagon official in the Cold War’s early years, concluded that their mutual buildups were less like a race than two runners on adjacent treadmills. “The only victory the arms race has to offer,” he wrote in 1975, was to “be first off the treadmill.”

冷战早期的五角大楼高级官员保罗·C·沃恩克(Paul C. Warnke)认为,两国核武库的扩张不太像是比赛,更像是两个人在相邻的跑步机上跑步。“军备竞赛的唯一胜利,”他在1975年写道,是“看谁第一个走下跑步机”。

Mr. Warnke’s view was controversial at the time, but later became accepted even by many dedicated Cold Warriors. The early 1980s had seen near misses that had brought the world intolerably close to the edge.

沃恩克的观点在当时充满争议,但是后来,就连很多热诚的冷战斗士也接受了它。20世纪80年代初出现了一些千钧一发的时刻,把全世界推向极度危险的边缘。

In 1983, for instance, a Soviet early-warning system detected an incoming American nuclear attack. It happened to be a moment of high tension in which the Kremlin had feared a pre-emptive strike.

例如,1983年,苏联的早期预警系统检测到美国即将进行核攻击。当时恰好是克里姆林宫担心美国先发制人的高度紧张时期。

Because of missile advances that had come as part of the arms race, the Soviets had only 23 minutes to respond before the missiles would land — not enough time to double-check equipment, much less negotiate with Washington. The arms race also dictated that the Soviet Union respond with overwhelming retaliation against the United States, to quickly neutralize any further threat.

作为军备竞赛的一部分,导弹技术得到发展,而这导致导弹落地前,苏联只有23分钟时间作出反应,没有足够的时间复核设备,更不用说与华盛顿谈判。军备竞赛还决定了苏联的回应必须是对美国进行强硬报复,迅速瓦解任何后续威胁。

The Soviet officer in charge of the early-warning station could see no evidence of a false alarm, but told his superiors that it was. His guess, proved correct, may have saved the world.

负责早期预警站的苏联军官看不到任何错误警报的证据,但是向上级报告称那是错误警报。他的猜测被证明是正确的,他可能拯救了这个世界。

Though the episode would not become public for years, Mr. Reagan wrote in his memoirs that another war scare, which occurred that same month when Soviet forces shot down a South Korean airliner that had wandered into Soviet airspace, “demonstrated how close the world had come to the precipice and how much we needed nuclear arms control.”

虽然该事件在之后的很多年里都没有公布,但里根在自己的回忆录里讲述了另一次战争恐慌。还是在那个月,苏联军队击落了一架误入苏联领空的韩国客机,“表明这个世界多么接近悬崖的边缘,我们多么需要控制核武器”。

Mr. Reagan principally turned against the arms race because of its dangers, but others came to oppose it for the simple reason that, after decades and billions or perhaps trillions of dollars, it had failed to accomplish victory.

里根转而反对军备竞赛,这主要是因为它的危险性,而其他人反对的原因很简单——在经过几十年时间,花费成千上万亿美元之后,它并没有带来胜利。

“Building nukes to get others to stop historically has had the same effect as telling everyone in an email storm to cease using ‘Reply All,’ ” Joshua H. Pollack, an expert at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, joked on Twitter.

“从历史角度看,为制止他人而制造核武器所产生的效果就像在电子邮件风暴中给所有人发邮件呼吁停止使用‘全部回复’,”詹姆斯·马丁防扩散研究中心(James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies)的专家乔舒亚·H· 波拉克(Joshua H. Pollack)在Twitter上开玩笑说。

Mr. Pollack added, “There is no last, winning move when it comes to arms racing.”

波拉克还说,“在军备竞赛方面,没有最后的制胜一步。”

The first response came from Cheryl Rofer, a retired nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National Research Laboratory: “But there is a last move.”

第一个作出回应的是洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室(Los Alamos National Laboratory)的退休核科学家谢丽尔·罗费尔(Cheryl Rofer)。她说:“但是有最后一步。”

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